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Synopsis 
Modern, Western post-industrial societies and our complex technological systems are subject 
to risks unparalleled in the history of mankind. These risks expose vulnerabilities in our 
technologies, our societies and our personal selves, as we become immersed in technologies 
without which our cultures cannot function. The proliferation of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) into all aspects of life poses unique risks for all of us. 
At the heart of ICTs lies the software which gives the computer its purpose. The aim of this 
thesis is to investigate how social and organizational factors influence the vulnerability of 
software systems and their users. The site where software is produced is studied through 
interviews among software developers. An interdisciplinary approach is employed; using 
theories of risk and vulnerability of complex technological systems, as well as theories from 
organizational sociology and software engineering. Scott A. Snook’s theory of practical drift 
is used as the basis for further analysis. 
Four areas are identified where social factors compel software developers to drift away from a 
global set of rules constituting software development processes and methods. Issues of 
pleasure and control, difference in mental models, undue production pressures, and 
fragmentation of responsibility all contribute to an uncoupling from established practices 
designed to guarantee the reliability of software. 
The implications of these factors in terms of vulnerabilities of software systems, its users, and 
ultimately of our societies are discussed. Directions for future research are identified, and a 
hope for the future is expressed, where software will be produced that instead of avoiding 
risks, tries to anticipate them. 
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 Preface 
Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work. 
-Aristotle  
The title of this thesis hints at the emotions experienced by software developers during the 
course of a development project. They find immense pleasure in manipulating the most 
complex technological artefact known to mankind, creating complex structures and edifices 
from intangible materials, using not much more than the power of their minds. Their pleasure 
is only matched by the pain felt when things do not go as envisioned; when the software does 
not do what it is supposed to; or when the product of their labour does not meet with user 
approval. 
For me, the process of writing this thesis has been exclusively a pleasurable experience, and I 
sincerely hope that Aristotle’s maxim will hold true for the end product. For someone 
originally trained as a computer scientist and software engineer, it has been most rewarding to 
learn to see science and technology in a new light, and be able to do fieldwork among old 
colleagues. 
I would like to thank the people at Telenor Mobile and FIRM who took time out from their 
busy schedules to be interviewed, especially Rodin Lie and Peter Myklebust who did most of 
the work recruiting other interviewees and acted as my “gate openers.” I am particularly 
grateful to my supervisor, Dr Anique Hommels , for her invaluable assistance and insightful 
comments at the various stages of the work with this thesis. My fellow ESST students in Oslo 
and Maastricht also deserve many thanks for their friendship and inspiring discussions both 
on- and off-topic; especially my Maastricht flatmates Jo Anders Heir, Stian Slotterøy Johnsen, 
and Zeynep Bağcı. 
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1 Vulnerable Software – Vulnerable Lives 
1.1 Introduction 
It is seven in the morning on Monday, October 26, 1992.1 At the London Ambulance Service 
(LAS), the brand new, custom-built Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) system goes live. The 
control room is filled with excitement, but also apprehension. LAS is the world’s largest 
ambulance service, and the staff are about to start using a computer system that is more 
advanced and complex than any ambulance service has ever had before.  The CAD system is 
supposed to aid emergence despatch operators by automating many of the tasks associated 
with taking emergency calls from the public and despatching ambulances to the correct 
location. With the old system they had to take down details of an emergency on a piece of 
paper and put this note on a conveyor belt that would take it on to further processing. The new 
system has advanced features such as a computerised map system with public call box 
identification, vehicle location tracking, automatic update of resource availability, automatic 
identification of duplicate calls, and automatic ambulance mobilization in simple cases. 
Compared to the manual system they have been using until now, the CAD system represents a 
quantum leap into the future. 
 As the London morning rush gets underway it becomes clear that things are going 
terribly wrong. Some emergency calls appear to get “lost” in the system so no ambulance is 
sent to people in critical condition. The delays cause distressed people to call the emergency 
number again and again. This increase in the number of calls causes waiting times of up to 30 
minutes before emergency calls can be dealt with. Other parts of the system fail too. The 
computerised map system refuses to recognize certain roads, forcing the operators to use 
                                                 
1 The following narrative is based on Flowers, 1996, chap. 4, except where otherwise referenced. 
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maps and telephones to give directions to ambulance drivers. The automatic allocation of 
ambulances to accident sites forces emergency crews further and further away from their 
home bases and into unfamiliar parts of the city, adding further to the delays and confusion. 
Even more distress calls are generated when ambulances fail to turn up at accident sites, 
arrive late, or turn up two at a time. 
 In the confusion, ambulance crews, who have received little training in the new 
system, fail to operate it in its intended manner, leading the CAD system to base its directives 
on incorrect information. The crews in turn become increasingly frustrated with the CAD 
system, ignoring its orders, causing even more confusion, frustration, and delays, which 
further compound the problems in a deadly vicious circle. Within 36 hours of operation, the 
system has to be shut down, and the operators are forced to use a hybrid solution, allocating 
ambulances manually. One week later, the whole system locks up altogether, and LAS has to 
revert back to the fully manual paper-based system.  
A later inquiry report (Page et al., 1993) concluded that “the computer system itself did 
not fail in a technical sense. Response times did on occasion become unacceptable, but overall 
the system did what it had been designed to do. However, much of the design had fatal flaws 
that would, and did, cumulatively lead to all symptoms of systems failure” (para. 1007x). 
Although no deaths have been directly linked to this incident (para. 6090-6091), it is clear that 
the introduction of the CAD system constituted an unacceptable risk to the inhabitants of 
London, jeopardizing their lives and health. The spectacular failure of the CAD system 
illustrates three kinds of vulnerabilities: the vulnerability of our personal selves, the 
vulnerability of our modern societies and the vulnerability of our computer systems. These 
vulnerabilities are the focus of this thesis. 
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1.2 The Role of Social Factors in Software Vulnerability 
I have chosen the LAS case as the starting point of this thesis since it provides a poignant 
example of how computers in general and software in particular can affect our lives and our 
well-being. It is also a good and well-documented example of how it is not always the 
technical aspects of technologies that constitute the largest risk, but that social and 
organizational factors must be taken into account when attempting to understand the 
technologies we surround ourselves with, the risks they pose for us, and the vulnerabilities 
they expose both in us and themselves. In this context, I take vulnerability to mean the ability 
of people or systems to survive and continue to function when subjected to unwanted events. 
This notion of vulnerability is further elaborated in section 2.2. 
 Dealing with information systems and information networks has become part of daily 
life in our modern technological cultures. Our economies are fuelled by the exchange of 
information. International financial markets and the global news media are just a few 
examples of activities that would be severely affected by only minor disruptions in the 
services provided by the global information systems we have built. These information 
systems are made up of interconnected computers. In the last decade, the Internet has grown 
from being a tool for scholars and researchers communicating mainly via e-mail, to a global 
marketplace and an indispensable source of information. Businesses rely on the Internet for 
communication with their customers and partners and for financial transactions; private 
citizens use it for news, e-commerce, public information and keeping in touch with friends 
and family. We all rely on the continuing operation of the payroll systems of our employers; 
the reservation systems of airlines and railway companies; and the tax systems of our 
governments. In short, the Internet and other complex information systems are becoming part 
of the technological infrastructure that is enmeshed with our culture. It is therefore important 
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to understand the vulnerabilities of complex computer systems and come to terms with issues 
related to security, privacy and reliability. 
Information systems are vulnerable in the sense that they are subject to hardware failure 
(e.g. disk crashes, power failures, component malfunctions), software failure (“bugs”, logical 
errors, etc.), unauthorised access, deliberate attempts to disrupt operation (“cracker” attacks, 
software viruses, denial of service attacks), etc. Issues of privacy and confidentiality are 
aspects that become increasingly important as individuals, businesses, and governments use 
computer systems for storing and communicating information. In addition, computer systems 
may not be adequately able to handle unforeseen events or accommodate changes in the 
system’s environment. These aspects will be discussed in detail later in this thesis. 
The goal of my research has been to investigate some of the social and organizational 
factors that contribute to the vulnerability of computer systems. I have looked specifically at 
the development of complex software systems by software professionals and how social 
issues relating to their backgrounds, their values and ideals, their interaction with managers 
and clients, and their work settings can impact the vulnerability of the software they produce. 
By using theories of risk and vulnerability of complex socio-technical systems to investigate 
how social factors can lead to a deterioration of such systems, I hop to shed new light on 
important issues that so far have been overlooked when analysing the vulnerabilities of 
computer systems. Particular emphasis has been placed on Snook’s (2000) theory of practical 
drift, especially the notion that local, pragmatic action within an organization can have 
detrimental and potentially catastrophic effects for the organization as a whole. Applying this 
theory to organizations constructing computer software and identifying factors that can 
contribute to this drift has been the main objective of this thesis. My research question can be 
summed up as: How do social and organizational factors during design and development of 
software influence the vulnerability of software systems and their users? 
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 We will return to the London Ambulance Service case at the end of this thesis. Before 
that we will examine what characterizes software as a technological artefact and look at issues 
of risk and vulnerability surrounding the development and use of software. We will then meet 
some software professionals at two companies that have to deal with these issues on a daily 
basis. Hopefully, we will emerge at the end with new insights into some of the factors that 
contribute to the vulnerability of software systems and thereby the vulnerability of our 
modern cultures that have come to rely so heavily on these technologies. 
1.3 Studying Social Aspects of Software Development and Use 
By emphasising the social aspects of the design and production of technology, I place myself 
firmly in the tradition of researchers within the field of science, technology, and society (STS) 
studies. Rejecting a naïve technological determinism viewing technological innovation as 
external to society, STS scholars investigate how social factors influence the development of 
technologies, as well as the construction of meaning surrounding these artefacts. While still 
acknowledging that science and technology can bring about changes in society and social life, 
they point out that existing human relationships, established meaning formations, everyday 
practices, interactions, and social structures shape technological changes. By opening up the 
“black box” of technology, i.e. looking at the content of technology and how it is shaped in an 
interaction with society and culture, STS researchers hope to gain a deeper understanding of 
our technological cultures and broaden the technology policy agenda.2 Researchers studying 
the social construction of technology emphasize the malleability of technologies, giving 
individuals and relevant social groups an interpretative flexibility in determining the social 
and cultural meanings of technological artefacts (Bijker, 1995). 
                                                 
2 See Williams & Edge, 1996, for an excellent overview of the field. Although they prefer to call the 
field “social shaping of technology” (SST), I feel that the term STS is more in line with contemporary 
usage. 
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 An interdisciplinary approach is the hallmark of STS studies. By drawing on research 
from philosophy, sociology, economy, and innovation studies, STS researchers use a diverse 
set of theories and methods in the study of science and technology, asking what is unique 
about science and technology in culture (Bowden, 1995, p. 77). Most STS scholars have 
concentrated on traditional, physical artefacts like bridges, domestic appliances, and rifles 
(Mackenzie & Wajcman, 1995); or bicycles and light bulbs (Bijker, 1995). The subject matter 
of this thesis is computer systems, or more specifically, software. In the following I will 
discuss what characterizes software and touch briefly on some of the STS theories that are 
relevant in understanding the social and cultural issues surrounding the development and use 
of software. 
Computer systems are commonly viewed in terms of hardware and software. The 
hardware is the physical artefacts involved, with the digital computer and its silicon-based 
integrated circuits containing millions of transistors per square centimetre at its heart, 
providing a universal calculating engine. In some sense, the digital computer is the ultimate 
malleable artefact, having the ability to be changed to provide any functionality that involves 
the storage, manipulation and calculation of any data that can be represented in numerical 
(digital) form. Software is what makes this possible; providing the reconfiguration of the 
computer and the algorithmic programs that harness its generic properties into a specific 
application. The production of software is therefore interesting from an STS perspective, 
since software is constantly shaping and reshaping the computer, inventing and reinventing its 
social meaning, and reconfiguring human interactions around it. The massive interconnection 
of computers into global information networks that has taken place in the last decade is 
impressive in terms of the hardware involved, but equally so for the innovations in software 
which lie behind it, enabling computers to “talk” and in doing so opening new social world 
for us human beings.  
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The advanced technological artefacts surrounding us are also increasingly relying on 
software for their operation. Almost everything from our washing machines to our television 
sets and our automobiles depend on computers and the software that makes them “run”. The 
fact that software is ubiquitous underlines the importance of investigating its characteristics 
and implications for our societies. 
The phrase commonly used to describe modern, networked computer technologies is 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). ICTs have attracted increased interest 
from researchers of many fields as the application of these technologies has become 
commonplace both at home and at work. The increased ubiquity of ICTs in modern societies 
has had profound consequences and reshaped social and organizational activity, especially in 
the workplace. Previous STS-related research has uncovered the processes that shaped 
computers and information networks during the cold war (e.g. Abbate, 1999; Ceruzzi, 1999; 
Edwards, 1995; Edwards, 1996), stressing the point that the structures and configurations of 
current ICTs are the result of social and economic processes. When it comes to the social 
shaping of software, Williams and Edge (1996, pp. 882-884) group the research into three 
major strands: the organizational sociology of software, the “social constructivist” analysis of 
software, and studies of the commodification of software.  
The organizational sociology of software has focused on studying the production and 
use of software, using theories and tools from industrial and organizational sociology. 
Researchers within this field have studied the division of labour and expertise during 
development of software, as well as the way gender and class relationships are changed or 
maintained through the application of computer systems in the workplace (e.g. Green et al., 
1993), and how conflicts over control of ICTs emerge (e.g. Murray & Knights, 1990).  
 Social constructivist scholars have advocated the study of the scientific laboratory in 
order to investigate the construction of meaning in science and technology (Latour & 
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Woolgar, 1979/1986). The software development process can also be viewed as a kind of 
laboratory, and it has consequently proven to be an attractive site for researchers within this 
field. MacKenzie (1993) has criticized the attempt to use formal mathematical methods to 
improve the reliability of software on the grounds that mathematical “proofs” are not absolute 
and open for controversy. Low and Woolgar (1993) have studied how the classifications of 
certain issues within a software development project as technical “is a thoroughly social 
accomplishment” (p. 54). The efforts to create “artificial intelligence” or “knowledge-based 
systems” have also attracted attention from philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, who 
criticize computer scientists naïve hopes of replicating competent, socialized human action in 
a machine (e.g. Collins, 1995). Sally Wyatt (1998) has investigated the introduction of 
computer networks in government administration in the U.K. and the U.S., criticizing the 
technological determinism inherent in the belief that the mere establishment of a technical 
infrastructure would cause changes in work practices and social interactions. 
Studies of the commodification of software have investigated how software has moved 
from bespoke applications tailored for a specific use to standardized “shrink-wrapped” 
packages. A case in point is the near monopoly of Microsoft’s Office package, which 
dominates the market in business and home “productivity” applications such as word 
processing and electronic spreadsheets. The dynamics behind the stabilization and 
commodification of such applications have been investigated with a view to the economic and 
organizational implications of these developments (e.g. Brady et al., 1992). 
Theories and methods from the social sciences have in the past decade attracted interest 
from researchers within software engineering and related fields. Unlike pure computer 
science theory, which usually only deals with technical issues intrinsic to the formal world of 
algorithms, data structures, and programming languages, researchers within software 
engineering deal with processes and methods for organizing software work and 
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communicating with future and existing users of software. Other software-related fields with 
a strong social element include human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer-supported 
cooperative work (CSCW). Scholars within these fields have turned to the social sciences in 
an attempt to find methods and tools that can help them improve their understanding of the 
social issues involved in software development, especially issues surrounding understanding 
the work done in the social settings in which the software is to be deployed and eliciting 
requirements from customers, users and other stakeholders in the software development 
process.3 The emphasis in these fields is usually not on investigating and understanding 
current software development practices as might be the case in a more traditional social 
science approach. It is rather about prescribing changes to existing practices in an attempt to 
intervene and improve them (Rönkkö & Lindeberg, 2000). Ethnography and other methods 
from social science then run the risk of being just another tool in the software developers’ 
toolbox, subordinate to the perhaps overly positivist mode of thinking within this profession. 
Floyd et al. (1992) provide a pioneering attempt to investigate the epistemological and 
philosophical foundations underlying software development. By bringing together scholars 
from philosophy, social science, informatics, and mathematics they seek to investigate 
computer scientists’ and software engineers’ notions of truth and proofs, their use of 
metaphors, and their view of their own reality and that of their users. By doing so, they are 
able to shed new light on old problems within the field of software development. Dittrich et 
al. (2002) is the most recent contribution of this interdisciplinary research into the conflation 
of social thinking and software practice. Their goal is to “promote the discourse about the 
interrelationship of social science-based approaches that shed light on the social aspects of 
software practice” (Klischewski et al., 2002, p. ix), by deconstructing software practice and 
related research, questioning established paradigms, analysing how social aspects of software 
                                                 
3 See Quintas (1993) for a collection of articles on the subject. 
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use are conceptualized, promoting a broader understanding of the software development 
process, adapting social thinking for improving software development methods, relating 
software practice to organizational change, and reorienting software practice by focusing on 
use-oriented design (pp. x-xi). This interdisciplinary approach and pioneering research has 
provided important inspiration for this thesis. 
1.4 Bridging Social Thinking and Software Practice 
The groundbreaking studies of the social processes surrounding the production and use of 
technological artefacts proved to be a breakthrough in understanding how technological 
artefacts are shaped by social activities, and how the social activities themselves are shaped 
by these artefacts. As we saw above, computers and software have been a ripe arena for STS 
research. This has been important research, expanding our knowledge about the role of 
computers and software in society. It has made us aware of the fact that ICTs can be used for 
different purposes, some more appealing in the eyes of different groups than others. Bringing 
different stakeholders and interest groups together to influence the development of ICTs can 
only be to the benefit of all involved. 
 A more limited amount of research has gone into studying the software developers and 
their social world. This is perhaps due to the difficulty of doing fieldwork among software 
developers, who mostly sit at a computer programming, typing in what is aptly named “code”. 
The intricacies of software development are usually poorly understood by non-professionals, 
making ethnographic studies of software professionals a frustrating task for social scientists; 
Low and Woolgar (1993) found the “technical talk” among software developers who were the 
target of their ethnographic fieldwork to be of “complete unintelligibility” (p.50). Within their 
field, software engineering researchers have embraced theories and methods from social 
science in order to improve their processes and to better understand the users, thus improving 
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the software they produce. Except for some pioneering, interdisciplinary minded scholars, 
however, they have generally not sought to use these tools in an attempt to investigate the 
epistemological and philosophical foundations of their own field. 
This “gap” between software engineering researchers trained in engineering and natural 
sciences, and philosophers and social science researchers has meant that the positivist 
assumptions behind much software engineering theory and methods have gone relatively 
unchallenged. This makes the construction of software a ripe arena for STS researchers, who 
with their interdisciplinary approach should be able to bring new insights to the field. This is 
what I hope to accomplish with this thesis. I intend to draw from the STS field a constructivist 
approach to understanding the design and production of technological artefacts. In addition, I 
will draw important ideas and inspiration from some of the more STS-minded studies of 
software professionals. Theories from organizational sociology on risk and accidents 
combined with recent research on software development will provide the analytical 
framework. Drawing empirical data from two case studies and using my personal knowledge 
and experience from the software engineering field, I hope to contribute new insights into 
how social factors influence how software is built and used, and how this affects the 
vulnerability of both the software and those who use it. 
1.5 Method 
Due to the scope of this thesis and the time and resource constraints involved, it was 
necessary to limit the original research question to something manageable, finding a path of 
inquiry that was feasible and that seemed likely to yield interesting results. By using some of 
the most influential theories of risk and vulnerabilities of complex technical systems (Perrow, 
1999/1984; Snook, 2000) as a theoretical foundation, it was possible to limit the scope of the 
original research question and formulate issues for further empirical work. 
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The main empirical basis for this thesis is a series of twelve interviews with software 
professionals in two companies. All the interviewees are directly involved with the 
development of software, either as developers (programmers), software architects, or 
managers. The main goal of these interviews was to identify social factors in everyday 
software development work that could have an impact on the quality and thus the 
vulnerability of the software developed by the interviewees. The interviews took the form of 
semi-structured qualitative interviews, lasting approximately one hour each. 
When determining which companies to contact in order to obtain interviewees, I 
approached personal acquaintances in the IT industry that were placed in such a way within 
their organization that they could act as “gate openers”. By getting these key people interested 
and involved in my thesis, they could put me in touch with individuals within their 
organizations who would be sympathetic to my research and who would have the authority to 
allocate the time and resources needed to conduct the interviews. This is in accordance with 
Stake’s criteria for case selection, “selecting a case of some typicality, but leaning towards 
those cases that seem to offer opportunity to learn” (1994, p. 243, original emphasis), and to 
select “that case from which we feel we can learn the most” (ibid.).  
The two companies ultimately selected as interview sites also provided intriguing 
contrasts. Telenor Mobile is the largest mobile telecommunications operator in Norway. It has 
1600 employees working with every aspect of mobile telecommunications. Software 
development is just one among a wide variety of activities. The software developers 
interviewed work in a section within the software development department responsible for the 
development and maintenance of “middleware” software – a highly technical domain without 
“end-users” in the traditional sense. The other company, FIRM, is a small entrepreneurial 
upstart with only 40 employees in Norway. The development of their Internet-based market-
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research software product is their main activity. They produce highly visible software with a 
wide range of non-technical users. The two companies are further described in section 3.2. 
My empirical research can be considered to be what Stake (1994) calls an 
“instrumental case study, [where] a particular case is examined in order to provide insight 
into an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive 
role, facilitating our understanding of something else” (p. 237, original emphasis). The focus 
was therefore not on the specific conditions at Telenor Mobile and FIRM, but on what I could 
learn about software developers and their attitudes towards risks and vulnerabilities, and the 
social and organizational factors that influence their work. My goal was to solicit “insider 
accounts” from these developers. According to Hammersley and Atkinson, accounts are 
important “for what they may be able to tell us about those who produced them. We can use 
what people say as evidence about their perspectives” (1995, p.125).  
Scholars have argued that interviews in the classical research tradition presuppose a 
particular epistemological position, assuming the existence of a social world “that is 
independent of the language used to describe it” (Seale, 1998, p. 202). The opposite position 
would be an idealist one “in which interview data – or indeed any account of the social world 
– are seen as presenting but one of many possible worlds” (p. 203). When analyzing the 
interview material, it was important to read the software developers accounts not as 
describing any objective social reality, but as their subjective perception of their world. Since 
no other groups at Telenor Mobile and FIRM were interviewed, no definitive claims can be 
made about the social configurations within these two companies. Nevertheless, since the 
present research investigates the attitudes of software developers and the social factors 
influencing them and their work, I believe the interview data constitute a valid basis for 
further analysis. Seale distinguishes between treating the interview as a topic, investigating 
how language is used in the interviews; or as a resource, gathering data about the external 
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world from interviewees’ accounts (p. 204). Although the emphasis in my research is more on 
the actual accounts of the software developers, important data can be gleaned by investigating 
the language employed by the interviewees and their linguistic repertoires, for instance when 
talking about their pleasures in programming. In this sense, the interview material is treated as 
both topic and resource. 
At Telenor Mobile, developers were asked to volunteer as interviewees. At FIRM, 
interviewees were selected by my “gatekeeper”, the director of development. At both sites, 
the interviewees constituted a significant portion of the total number of developers, 
diminishing the potential for bias. Given the nature of the research, I believe that the selection 
of interviewees did not have significant impact on the data that was acquired through the 
interviews. The majority of the people interviewed at Telenor Mobile and FIRM were 
software developers and software architects who routinely do programming as part of their 
normal work. In addition, at Telenor Mobile the section manager directly in charge of the 
developers was interviewed; at FIRM both the director of development and the quality 
assurance (QA) manager were interviewed. A complete list of the interviewees can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 The interviewees were relatively homogeneous when it comes to age and 
education; they were all aged from the late twenties to the mid thirties, having Master-level 
educations from one of the four Norwegian universities. This is a common background for 
Norwegian software developers. In addition, all the interviewees were male, a fact that sadly 
reflects the current state of affairs in the Norwegian IT industry. In 1996, only 8 % of first 
year students at the computer science and communications technology studies at the 
   15 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology4 were female (Women in Computing, n.d., 
para. 1-2). With only 50 % of the female students completing the 4.5 years Master program, 
this means that female software developers are a rare sight in Norwegian companies. 
Although this historical low point sparked efforts to increase the number of women in these 
professions, the results of these efforts are yet to be seen in the workplace. I therefore hope 
that the reader will forgive me for using the male pronoun when referring to the singular 
software developer. While other researchers have looked explicitly at gender differences 
among computer scientists and software developers (e.g. Rasmussen & Håpnes, 1991; Kleif 
& Faulkner, 2003), this is not an issue in this thesis.  
As recommended by Seale, a topic guide was prepared before the interviews, 
containing topics that were to be covered during the interview. Nevertheless, I attempted to be 
as non-directive as possible, asking open-ended questions and encouraging the interviewees to 
tell their story in their own words. Since I and all the interviewees are native Norwegians, the 
interviews were conducted in the Norwegian language. I do not believe that this had any 
undue influence on the outcome of the interviews. The terminology in the software 
development field is heavily influenced by English, and I believe that the main concepts of 
risk and vulnerability have Norwegian counterparts that have very close, if not identical, 
semantic contents. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed in order to facilitate 
further analysis. Direct quotes were translated into English by me before inclusion in this 
thesis. In doing so, I have attempted to strike a balance between following the original 
wording and conveying the tone of the original. 
                                                 
4 The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim is the main site for 
computer science education in Norway, having more Master-level computer science graduates then all 
the other colleges and universities combined. 
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 To the extent that my own background as a software developer5 influenced the 
interviewees and the material gathered, I believe this to have enabled me to establish a better 
rapport with the interviewees, showing them that I was familiar with their area of expertise, 
their language and terminology, as well as their norms and values. Any bias on my part would 
have to be blamed on the same familiarity and personal identification with the interviewees, 
perhaps contributing to a tendency to view matters from the point of view of the developers 
and a “blind spot” to different perspectives. On the other hand, Collins (1984) advocates 
“participant comprehension”, demanding that “the investigator him/herself should come to be 
able to act in the same way as the native members ‘as a matter of course’” (p. 61, original 
emphasis). In this sense, my past as a “native” software developer should have enabled me to 
achieve a much better comprehension of the software developers than most ethnographers 
venturing into this field. 
In addition to my own empirical material, I studied other cases from the literature on 
risk, failures and accident involving software and computer systems (Leveson, 1995; Flowers, 
1996; Neumann, 1995; Library of failed information systems projects, n. d.). Especially 
inspiring was the London Ambulance Service case (Page et al., 1993), which started this 
thesis. These cases provided a valuable background for my empirical work and poignant 
examples of the vulnerabilities of software systems, as well as the vulnerabilities of those who 
use them. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
In chapter 2 I will present theories pertaining to risk and vulnerability. Ulrich Beck’s notion 
of the risk society will be introduced, and I will discuss the idea that we also live an 
                                                 
5 I hold a sivilingeniør (Master level) degree in computer science from the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (1995) and have worked as a software developer for more than six years. I 
was also an employee of FIRM for most of 1999. 
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information society and how this affects our vulnerabilities. Charles Perrow’s normal accident 
theory and Scott A. Snook’s theory of practical drift will be discussed in detail, since they 
form the basis for the subsequent analysis of the empirical material. Chapter 3 contains the 
results from interviewing 12 software professionals in two Norwegian companies about their 
attitudes towards risks and vulnerabilities in their daily work. Emphasising issues of pleasure 
and control, the formation of mental models, fragmentation of responsibility, and production 
pressures, I investigate whether Perrow and Snook’s theories can be fruitfully applied to the 
development of software systems. Finally, in chapter 4 I summarize the findings, discuss their 
implications for software engineering work, and try to identify directions for further research. 
An appendix at the end lists all the software professionals interviewed during the work with 
this thesis. 
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2 The Risky Information Society 
2.1 Introduction: The Risk Society 
As citizens of modern, Western societies, we are surrounded by pervasive scientific, 
technological and industrial developments, without which modern society cannot be 
imagined. In short, we are immersed in technological cultures (Bijker, 2001). While 
providing us with an unparalleled standard of living, consumer products and inexpensive 
energy, the inescapable consequences of these developments are a set of risks and hazards that 
also are unparalleled in the history of mankind. These risks and hazards are no longer limited 
in time and space, and there is no one to be held accountable. Accidents in nuclear power 
plants such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl can cause radioactive material to enter the 
atmosphere, making large areas far away from the plant itself uninhabitable and increasing the 
risk of cancer and foetal deformation for generations to come. Routine discharges of 
technetium-99 from the Sellafield reprocessing plant on the Western coast of England can be 
found in marine life as far away as the Svalbard islands in the Arctic (Martiniussen, 2002). 
The burning of oil and coal in power plants in the U.K. and Central Europe are known to 
cause acid rain in Scandinavia (Acid Rain, 2001). 
 The Collins English Dictionary defines risk as “the possibility of incurring misfortune 
or loss; hazard” (Hanks, 1986, p. 1318). A British Royal Society study group set up to 
investigate risks in engineering and public perceptions of risk, defines risk as “the probability 
that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of time, or results from a 
particular challenge” (Warner, 1992). According to Renn (1992), “the term risk denotes the 
possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of natural 
events or human activities” (p. 56, original emphasis). A high risk denotes a greater 
probability that adverse effects will occur than with a low risk. Renn notes that all concepts of 
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risk presuppose a distinction between reality and possibility, since within a fatalistic belief in 
a predetermined future the term risk makes no sense. A concept of risk implies making a 
causal connection between events and their effects, thereby making it possible to avoid or 
mitigate the adverse effects by avoiding or modifying the causal events. 
Exactly which activities or phenomena constitute risks is open to dispute, since the 
concept of risk is “open to social definition and construction” (Beck, 1986/1992, p. 23). How 
risks are perceived is therefore an issue with profound social, economic and political 
implications. Any attempt to define a specific phenomenon as a risk and quantify the degree 
of risk involved is destined to be disputed by groups with conflicting interests. Nevertheless, 
the continuous assessment of risks and the weighing of risks versus perceived benefits seem 
to have become an integral part of life in our modern societies. The impossibility of 
determining any objective risks involved in human activities makes the perception of these 
risks much more important when investigating the influence of risks on people’s behaviour 
and individual assessments of risks. The role of the media has therefore been the subject of 
research into the public perception of risk. 
Risk scholars have in the last decade shifted our view of accidents and disasters from 
seeing them as the product of random, freakish events, to having social, organizational causes. 
The poison gas leak at Bhopal in 1984, the radiation leak from Chernobyl in 1986, and other 
fatal disasters spawned much research into the causes of such tremendous technical failures, 
shifting the focus from technical malfunctions to the social and organizational configurations 
that contributed to these accidents (Jasanoff, 1994). 
Since the publication of Ulrich Beck’s (1986/1992) seminal work, the notion of the 
risk society has become an important concept in both theoretical and political discourse. 
According to Beck, the industrial society that was the child of modernity is growing into the 
risk society of post-modernity. While modern, industrial society was about the distribution of 
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benefits (“goods”) from industrial production, the risk society is about distribution of the risks 
(“bads”) that are the inevitable, complementary consequences of the industrial society. These 
risks are not distributed equally alongside the benefits, but will often be imposed on people 
who are not in a position to benefit from the “goods” of this risk production. 
 The risks unique to the post-industrial society are related to our increased reliance on 
complex technological systems, without which we would be helpless. The electricity, gas, and 
water infrastructures; the road and rail networks; sea and air transport; when we use these 
technologies we accept that there are risks involved in using them. We subject ourselves to 
the risk of death or injury every day by using gas ovens, driving a car, or getting into an 
airplane. We accept those risks because we feel they are greatly outweighed by the benefits of 
these technologies. A different set of risks involved with the use of these technologies might 
be overlooked, however. The risks we run by making our societies rely on the uninterrupted 
operation of these technological systems, usually do not come to the forefront until an 
accident or failure makes them clear to us. Recent electricity blackouts in North America, 
Scandinavia and Italy are cases in point. 
 The terrorist attacks of recent years have focused our attention on the risks from 
external forces, such as the possibilities for malicious assaults on our technical infrastructures, 
cities and businesses. The September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York 
showed us that our technological artefacts and complex systems can be turned against us, 
becoming the tools of terrorists. The reality and horror of these events and the external risks 
notwithstanding, we should not be distracted from other, internal risks associated with 
complex socio-technical systems. The ways we manage our technological systems and 
organize their operation may also be sources of risk. As we shall see later, the complexities 
involved in designing and operating modern technologies can themselves be sources of risk. 
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 The last two decades have seen an explosive growth in a new form of complex 
technological systems. While information and communications technologies (ICTs) can trace 
their origins back 60 years, advances in ICTs have only recently made them ubiquitous in the 
work place and in our homes. Without modern computer and telecommunication networks 
working properly, global financial markets would collapse, national and international 
transport would grind to a standstill, and groceries would no longer fill the shelves of our 
supermarkets. Indeed, many commentators have claimed that since information is the primary 
commodity of modern society, we can speak of an information society qualitatively different 
from previous eras. An influential voice here has been the Spanish sociologist Manuel 
Castells with his three-volume work entitled The Information Age (Castells, 1996-8). 
However, as Frank Webster points out (Webster, 2002, p. 8), Castells and other researchers 
have greatly differing opinions as to what constitutes an information society and how to 
measure the degree to which a society can be said to be informational. While some theorists 
emphasise the emergence of technological artefacts, most notably information and 
communications technologies (ICTs), others see changes in economic, occupational, spatial or 
cultural configurations as more indicative of an information society. According to Webster, it 
is difficult to identify any quantitative or qualitative measures that unequivocally set the 
“information society” apart from previous eras. 
Webster’s critique notwithstanding, I think it would be rash to dismiss the information 
society altogether. I believe it is important to investigate why this notion has found such wide 
acceptance, especially among politicians. There is widespread use of the term in public and 
political discourse. Although theorists routinely employ the term in a broader sense, in 
general discourse the emerging information society seems to be closely associated with the 
growing number of interconnected computers in physical information networks (most notably 
the Internet) and the consequential fall in cross-border communication and organizational 
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costs. The term is mainly used to denote the possibilities and challenges posed by the growing 
use of ICTs and information networks in our increasingly globalised societies. It is this 
narrower meaning of the term “information society” that will be the basis for the present 
analysis. 
In the information society, ICTs and the media play a major role in the formation of 
risks, risks sensibilities and risk perceptions (Van Loon, 2000). As Van Loon points out: 
As the global economy, the world political order and most socio-cultural 
systems are nowadays bound to high-speed and high-frequency information 
flows, there is no escape from the impact of telecommunications on processes 
of decision-making and anticipation. However, apart from accelerating 
information flows, ICTs also contribute to the acceleration of risks. (Van Loon, 
2002, p. 12) 
The mere speed of information exchange diminishes the time available for contemplation and 
reflection, with the consequences that may have for decision-making and political processes. 
Further investigation into the role of ICTs and risks in the information society is therefore 
warranted. The proliferation of ICTs also has consequences for the vulnerability of our 
societies, as we shall see in the next section. 
2.2 Vulnerability of the Information Society 
The Collins English Dictionary defines “vulnerable” as “1. capable of being physically or 
emotionally wounded or hurt. 2. open to temptation, persuasion, censure, etc.” (Hanks, 1986, 
p. 1702). Vulnerability is then the quality or state of being vulnerable. Blaikie et al. (1994) see 
this term in the context of natural hazards: 
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By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group in terms of 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a 
natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to 
which someone’s life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable 
event in nature or in society. (p. 9). 
These definitions emphasise the vulnerability of individuals or groups of individuals when 
faced with unwanted events. However, vulnerability can also be exhibited by systems. 
Einarsson and Rausand (1998) employ the term to “describe the properties of an industrial 
system that may weaken its ability to survive and perform in the presence of threats” (p. 535), 
focusing on “the (business) survivability of the system” (p. 542). Systems in this context may 
be “societies or states, a population of inhabitants in a certain geographical region, companies 
or technical systems” (Wackers, n. d., Various definitions). When investigating the 
vulnerability of software systems, the emphasis will be on this systemic definition of 
vulnerability, since: 
Vulnerability is also often used in relation to a society’s information and 
communication infrastructures. A society’s vulnerability to technical 
breakdowns, electronic terrorism and electronic warfare rises in accordance 
with the increasing centrality of ICT infrastructures for important sectors of 
society (finance, administration, defense, business). (Ibid.)  
Clearly, the ubiquity of ICTs in the Western world has profound implications for our personal 
vulnerabilities and the vulnerability of our societies. 
When discussing the hazards contributing to the vulnerability of ICTs rather then the 
abstract notion of vulnerability, I prefer to use the plural term vulnerabilities, denoting the 
diverse set of “weak spots” that make a system susceptible to damage or failure. 
Vulnerabilities can be exploited by external forces outside the system itself, or they can be the 
source of internal systemic failures. ICTs are clearly vulnerable to a long list of threats, both 
external and internal. Power failures and other physical hazards such as earthquakes, water 
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floods, etc. can seriously impair a systems ability to function as intended. These 
vulnerabilities can best be dealt with by physical safety measures such as redundant power 
supplies or duplicate systems in different locations. Other external threats may take advantage 
of weak points that are the result of internal vulnerabilities. Attempts at unauthorized access 
(“cracker” attacks6); deliberate attempts to disrupt the normal operation of systems through 
denial of service attacks7; computer viruses, worms, and “Trojan horses;”8 all of these are 
external threats that can compromise computer systems. These malicious attacks are 
motivated by a variety of factors, but have become commonplace in today’s interconnected 
world. They need to be taken very seriously by anyone with a computer connected to the 
Internet or any other computer network. 
 The internal vulnerabilities of a computer system are normally related to software. 
Flaws and errors in the program code are known as “bugs,”9 and are inevitable in any 
program of non-trivial size. The exponential cost of tracking down and fixing bugs is a well 
known phenomenon for software professionals. Some bugs make the computer “crash” (i.e. 
cease normal program execution), while others cause more subtle errors in calculations or 
data manipulation. Others again may give rise to security flaws that can be exploited in the 
ways mentioned above. 
                                                 
6 In popular usage, the term “hacker” denotes someone who attempts to gain unauthorized access to 
computer systems. Dedicated programming virtuosos feel that this is an unfortunate appropriation of a 
term they reserve for themselves. They prefer to call the computer criminals “crackers”. 
7 For instance by flooding a system with requests for service, tying up computing resources and 
bandwidth to the detriment of legitimate users. 
8 A computer virus is a small program that spreads itself from computer to computer by attaching itself 
to other programs or files, possibly carrying a destructive “payload”. A worm is similar to a virus, but 
does not need another program to spread itself. A Trojan horse is a malicious program masquerading 
as a useful program, but containing malicious software that for instance creates a “back door” into the 
affected computer to be exploited at a later time. 
9 The origin of the word is usually attributed to an episode in the early days of computing, when a 
computer malfunction was found to be caused by an insect (“bug”) who had managed to get inside the 
computer, thereby causing the failure. Hence also the word “debugging” for the process of tracking 
down software errors. 
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 Apart from the systemic vulnerabilities associated with ICTs, we also have to consider 
the vulnerabilities imposed by ICTs on their users, as well as society in general. As mentioned 
above, security flaws or software bugs can give unauthorized persons access to information 
systems, possibly violating the privacy or confidentiality of individuals or corporations. These 
vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly important as companies and governments use 
computer systems to store and process information about their customers or citizens. The 
existence of false or misleading information can have grave consequences for individuals, for 
instance in connection with credit ratings or criminal records. 
 Another aspect of the vulnerability of the users of ICTs relates to the extent that 
computer systems expose their users to hazards. People regularly trust their lives and safety to 
computers; modern aircraft are for instance “fly by wire”, i.e. fully under the control of 
computers; computers monitor nuclear power plants and control medical equipment. Fatal 
accidents that were traced to software errors have occurred in all these areas. Other computer 
systems may not put their users’ life in direct jeopardy, but still put them at risk when their 
functions and capabilities do not match the requirements of the users. A computer system 
could be operating without technical flaws, but still fail to provide its users with the 
functionality they need in order to perform their tasks. The system could also be inadequately 
equipped to handle unforeseen events or accommodate changes in its environment. The 
mismatch between user requirements and the actual capabilities of the computer system could 
compel users to change their interactions with the system, using it in ways not intended by its 
original designers. This could in turn expose further vulnerabilities both in the system itself 
and in its users. Vulnerabilities of this kind are predominantly related to the design of 
software, and therefore highly relevant to this thesis and the research question at hand. 
Examining the conditions under which software is developed, and learning as much as we can 
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about the vulnerabilities of computer systems, has therefore become crucial in assessing the 
vulnerability of the information society as a whole. 
 In order to establish a theoretical framework with which to analyse the social and 
organizational factors contributing to these vulnerabilities, we turn to two influential theories 
within the research on high-risk systems: Charles Perrow’s normal accident theory and Scott 
A. Snook’s theory on practical drift. These are covered in the next two sections. 
2.3 Normal Accidents vs. High Reliability 
One of the seminal works on risks and accidents is Perrow’s Normal accidents (1984/1999). 
By examining a large number of accidents in fields as diverse as nuclear power plants, 
petrochemical plants, aircraft, the space program, and DNA research, Perrow is able to 
formulate normal accident theory (NAT). His basic tenet is that accidents are inherent to any 
technical or socio-technical system exhibiting certain characteristics; in such systems 
accidents are bound to happen – it is in this sense that accidents are normal. 
In order to analyse a system’s propensity for accidents, Perrow introduces the concepts 
of complexity and coupling. To measure a system’s complexity we must look at the 
interactions between the components of the system. Most systems are designed with linear 
interactions in mind. Linear interactions are the well understood, sequential interactions 
where a component will typically get its input from an “upstream” component, do some sort 
of transformation, and subsequently deliver its output to a “downstream” component. If one 
component fails, it is relatively easy to locate and understand the point of failure and 
consequently handle it without catastrophic results. 
On the other hand, if a component of the system serves multiple functions or is 
connected to several other components, the interactions are said to be complex. A component 
such as a water pump in a nuclear plant may be used for several different tasks, reducing the 
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costs of the plant. A failure of this one component, however, will affect the operation of the 
system in a much more serious manner than in the linear case. The failure can manifest itself 
in ways that make the source of the failure difficult to locate and handle, thus increasing the 
potential for disaster. The possibilities for unplanned and unexpected sequences of events are 
much greater in systems with complex interactions. 
The concept of coupling is used by Perrow to classify systems according to the 
strength of the connections between their internal components. The term tight coupling is 
meant to describe a situation where there is no slack or buffer between two items, so that what 
happens in one directly affects what happens in the other. This originally mechanical term is 
used as a metaphor for systems where there are more time-dependent processes; more 
invariant sequences; there is only one way of reaching the goal; and there is little slack in 
supplies, equipment and personnel. Conversely, in loosely coupled systems processing delays 
are possible, the order of sequences can be changed, alternative methods to achieve the goal 
are possible, and slack in resources is possible. 
Traditionally, accidents like the one at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 
the U.S. in 1979 have been blamed on human error, specifically errors on the part of the 
operators responsible for monitoring and controlling the plant. Perrow’s view is that the cause 
of such accidents must be sought after in other places than in the apparent failure of human 
operators. The sheer complexity of these large technical systems makes the interactions 
incomprehensible to any individual or even group of individuals. Accordingly, accidents are 
inherent properties of the complex and tightly coupled system. 
It is important to emphasis that a system is not either complex or linear, nor is it either 
tightly or loosely coupled. Any system will have both complex and linear interactions and 
tightly coupled as well as loosely coupled subsystems. Perrow’s point is that the more 
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complex interactions a system exhibits, and the more tightly coupled it is, the more the risk of 
accidents increases, and so the vulnerability of the system. 
Since Perrow’s theory sees accidents as “normal” within tightly coupled, complex 
systems, it has been criticized for not being able to prescribe remedies that could help us build 
safer systems. Indeed, Perrow’s only solution seems to be that we abandon the idea of 
building complex systems like nuclear power plants altogether, because the risks are too great 
to bear. Perrow’s theory also underplays the dynamic aspects of systems and organizations, 
since he does not discuss how the risks and vulnerabilities can change over time. For Perrow, 
these are inherent properties of the systems which can only be changed by changing the 
system itself to make it more loosely coupled and reducing the number of complex 
interactions.  
To se the relevance of Perrow’s theory for this investigation into the risks of software 
systems, we have to look at some of the unique properties of software that make it inherently 
complex. Every part of a software system is unique. Almost by definition, if a software 
developer has produced two equal modules of the same system, then he has not done his job 
properly, since the code for one module could have been reused in the other. In fact, much of 
a software developer’s task consists of finding similarities and abstracting behaviour in such a 
way that the same code can be used in as many situations as possible. This means that any 
software system engineered after these principles will exhibit a very high degree of 
complexity, since any component of the system will be used for several different tasks and 
will be connected to many other subcomponents. A failure of any such component will 
therefore have a large detrimental impact on the operation of the system as a whole. An error 
in a subcomponent that is widely used across the system can be hard to track down and fix. 
Coupling is a concept that is used in software engineering theory as well as in accident 
theory. A widely use software engineering textbook defines coupling as: 
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Coupling is a measure of interconnection among modules in a software 
structure. Coupling depends on the interface complexity between modules, the 
point in which entry or reference is made to a module, and what data pass 
across the interface. In software design, we strive for the lowest possible 
coupling. Simple connectivity among modules results in software that is easier 
to understand and less prone to a “ripple effect” … caused when errors occur at 
one location and propagate through a system. (Pressman & Ince, 2000, p. 347) 
Clearly, this notion of coupling is related to Perrow’s concept, although the match is not 
complete. While software engineering practice dictates minimizing the degree of coupling by 
confining the interactions between components to a limited number of clearly defined 
interconnections, this does not necessarily decrease the coupling in Perrow’s sense. The 
interconnections can still be strong even if they are limited in number. Processes can still be 
time-dependent; there can be invariant sequences; and little slack in the interactions between 
components, even in a system with low degrees of coupling in the software engineering sense 
of the word. In fact, all of these factors which constitute tight coupling in Perrow’s sense are 
abundant in most software system. Normal accident theory therefore tells us that failures in 
software systems should come as no surprise, they are to be expected, and thus normal. 
Perrow’s theory has drawn criticism from the STS field, where scholars have pointed 
out that his position is a technological determinist one. By viewing accidents as purely causal 
effects of the properties of technological systems, he underestimates the influence of social 
factors on these issues, and prematurely absolves us from the responsibility for technological 
disasters. He also takes away our ability to deal with these issues through social and 
organizational measures. While still providing us with important tools for evaluating the risks 
and vulnerabilities associated with specific technological system, we need to elaborate further 
on his ideas in order to arrive at a satisfying theoretical basis for the present research 
questions. 
Perrow and other proponents of normal accident theory study dramatic accidents and 
spectacular systemic failures, stressing the inevitability of accidents in complex systems. 
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Other researchers have concentrated on successful complex organizations, or high reliability 
organizations (Roberts, 1990; Sagan, 1993). High-reliability theorists tend to take a more 
optimistic view of our ability to manage complex systems and organizations. While still 
acknowledging failures as inevitable, they advocate technical and organizational measures 
such as continuous training, accountability, and redundancy (duplicating technical subsystems 
or organizational functions to reduce the likelihood of accidents should one component fail). 
These measures are believed to reduce the risks to acceptable levels. 
For a more dynamic view of risks and vulnerabilities, combining the features of normal 
accident theory and high reliability theory, and providing us with a basis for analysing the 
social and organizational aspects of risks and vulnerabilities, we turn to Scott A. Snook and 
his theory of practical drift. 
2.4 Practical Drift 
In his book Friendly fire (2000), Scott A. Snook undertakes a thorough analysis of the 1994 
incidents when two U.S. Air Force fighter planes accidentally shot down two U.S. Army 
helicopters carrying U.N. peacekeepers over Northern Iraq after erroneously identifying the 
friendly Black Hawk helicopters as enemy Iraqi Hinds. An Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) aircraft, equipped with highly advanced radar and communication 
equipment was in place, monitoring air traffic and communicating with aircraft in the area, 
but did not act to prevent the fighter planes engaging and shooting down the friendly 
helicopters. All 26 people aboard the helicopters perished. No serious technical malfunction 
could be found and no single human error could explain how this tragedy could occur. 
Consequently, the causes of the accident had to be sought in the social and organizational 
fabric of military operations. By investigating the incident and tracking the events that led up 
to the fatal shooting, Snook is able to formulate a theory of organizational breakdown that 
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offers an explanation of how a tragedy like the friendly fire incident over Northern Iraq can 
happen in an organization that is specifically designed to avoid this kind of accident. By 
developing accounts of the accident on several levels, from the individual, group, and 
organizational levels to a cross-level account, Snook builds his theory of practical drift – “the 
slow, steady uncoupling of practice from written procedure” (p. 194). 
Snook argues that in any organization, rules and procedures laid down when designing 
the organization will not be able to cover all situations that may arise. Rules may even be 
conflicting, or minute adherence to detailed procedure may not be possible for practical 
reasons or may be in direct conflict with the overall task at hand. Also, the operational 
environment of the organization will change over time, rendering rules and procedures 
increasingly obsolete. In such situations, local practices will develop that are seen as locally 
efficient, growing out of the logic of the task in hand. Snook calls this “practical action.” 
Across all levels of his analysis and with all actors involved, Snook finds that “globally 
untoward action is justified by locally acceptable procedure” (p. 182). Practical action is the 
driving force behind practical drift. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical Matrix (Adapted from Snook, 2000, p. 186) 
 
The matrix in Figure 1 illustrates Snook’s theory of practical drift. It captures three 
dimensions: situational coupling, logics of action, and time. The vertical axis represents the 
degree of coupling inside an organization. This concept is borrowed from Perrow’s accident 
theory as described above, and refers to the level of interdependence between subunits within 
the organization. In a tightly coupled organization, each subunit has frequent communications 
and interactions with most of the other subunits and the actions of one subunit directly affect 
what happens in the other subunits. Unlike Perrow, however, Snook focuses on the dynamic 
nature of coupling. The patterns of interdependence between subunits change back and forth 
over time as the organization faces different contexts. Different situations encountered by the 
organization entail different demands in terms of subunit cooperation. A loosely coupled 
situational context can be handled by one or a low number of subunits without involving the 
other subunits, thereby minimizing the need for communication and interaction. In a tightly 
coupled situation, however, coordinated actions from many or all of the subunits are required. 
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In the military domain of Snook’s research, the routine day-to-day air operations in the “no 
fly zone” in Northern Iraq constituted a loosely coupled situation, requiring little interaction 
between the army and air force subunits of the military task force. However, a combat 
situation requiring the joint efforts of all military branches is a very tightly coupled situation 
indeed, requiring communication and interaction between all subunits involved, and the 
observance of globally understood rules. As we shall see later, this transition from a loosely 
coupled to a tightly coupled situational context is where practical drift can manifest its most 
dangerous consequences. 
The horizontal axis represents what Snook calls logics of action, defined as “systems 
of scripts, norms, and schemas among which people shift according to context” (p. 188). They 
are “context-dependent mind-sets or frames that influence behavior in predictable ways” 
(ibid.). Members of an organization change their logics of action depending on the context 
they are faced with. In this case between rule-based logics of action, where the rules take 
precedence in governing people’s actions, and task-based logics of action, where behaviour is 
adapted to solving the tasks at hand. 
The circle of arrows in the middle of the diagram represents time. The arrows suggest 
a circular motion between the four quadrants of the matrix; each quadrant representing a 
different combination of situational coupling and logics of action. Quadrant 1 is the system as 
designed on the drawing board, with a set of global rules and procedures prescribed by the 
designers. The rules of an organization will frequently be designed with the most demanding 
and tightly coupled situation in mind, making sure that such a situation will be handled 
correctly. Quadrant 2 represents an organization that is operating as designed. The transition 
from quadrant 1 to quadrant 2 happens when an organization is set up; in Snook’s case when 
the United States launched “Operation Provide Comfort” in Northern Iraq and the “Combined 
Task Force Provide Comfort” took to the field. At first, the novice members of the 
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organization followed the rules as they were designed by the Pentagon system planners. The 
situation and organization were new to everybody involved, so rules were followed under the 
assumption that not following them could have severe consequences, at least in the form of 
punishment from superiors. The rules were designed with a tightly coupled, worst-case 
combat scenario in mind. This scenario would require extensive interactions between all the 
different military units involved in the operation. However, the actual, day-to-day operations 
of the task force did not require these extensive interactions. Instead, each unit found itself 
performing its tasks relatively independent of the others. U.S. Army helicopters would ferry 
military personnel and U.N. peacekeepers in and out of the area, while Air Force fighter 
planes would patrol the no fly zone. Airborne air traffic controllers would monitor the skies 
above Northern Iraq in their highly advanced AWACS “control tower in the sky”. In effect, 
the situation was loosely coupled, but with the members of the organization following rules 
designed for a very tightly coupled situation. This is an unstable state of affairs, and the point 
where practical drift sets in. 
The transition to quadrant 3 of the matrix is characterized by a shift from a rule-based 
to a task-based logics of action. As mentioned, the members of the organization at first feel 
obligated to follow the detailed set of rules set up to govern the general operation of the 
organization and the interactions between its subunits. However, as they become more 
familiar with the operational context, the focus shifts from following the rules to completing 
the tasks at hand. Since the organization encounters loosely coupled situations most of the 
time, the detailed rules designed to cope with tightly coupled situations may feel overly 
controlling and an unreasonable burden. The rules may not even match the practical situations 
that arise in real life operation; they may be difficult to comply with within the constraints of 
time and resources; or following the rules may actually be in direct conflict with the tasks at 
hand. Over time, global rules may become increasingly irrelevant to the local situations. The 
36 
completion of tasks takes precedence over following the rules, and locally practical 
interpretations and adaptations occur. As Snook puts it, “[w]hen the rules don’t match, 
pragmatic individuals adjust their behavior accordingly; they act in ways that better align with 
their perceptions of current demands. In short, they break the rules” (p. 193). It is worth to 
point out that practical drift is not a symptom of wilfully negligent behaviour of members of 
the organization – this is normal. Not in Perrow’s sense that it is a direct property of the 
system, but in the sense that this is normal behaviour by normal people. The process is usually 
gradual and imperceptible, hence the notion of drift. As Snook puts it: “After extended 
periods of time, locally practical actions within subgroups gradually drift away from 
originally established procedures” (p. 194, original emphasis). Usually, the demand for 
efficiency at the local level is the reason behind the drift and determines its path. Therefore, 
“[o]ver time, incremental actions in accordance with the drift meet no resistance, are 
implicitly reinforced, and hence become institutionally accepted within each subunit” (p. 
194). Each day that passes without any adverse effects from the local adaptation of rules will 
grow a false sense of confidence and contribute to a reinforcement of the local practices. 
Different subgroups will tend to develop different local adaptations to the globally 
defined rules. Different local contexts entail different pragmatics in response to the tasks of 
the subunit. In Task Force Provide Comfort, incoming aircrews were initially briefed on the 
colour schemes of enemy aircraft. For some reason, this requirement disappeared or “drifted 
away” over the years. Army helicopters were initially required to file detailed flight plans and 
stay in constant communication with AWACS crews. However, since helicopter flights were 
done on an ad-hoc basis and the destinations often were unknown at the start of the flight, it 
was not possible to complete flight plans in advance and keep AWACS controllers informed. 
Although people within one unit may have adapted rules and procedures to fit their local 
context, they will usually assume that people in the rest of the organization are sticking to the 
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original set of globally established rules. They are not aware of the drift that has occurred in 
other units, which is what can have disastrous consequences as the situational context 
changes. 
When a loosely coupled situation suddenly becomes a tightly coupled one, we move 
from quadrant 3 to quadrant 4. For some reason, a coordinated effort of many or all subunits 
is required; making communication, interaction and adherence to common rules and 
procedures necessary. Years of drift away from the established baseline of global rules along 
different paths result in a catastrophic coordination failure as each unit follows its own locally 
adapted set of procedures, while at the same time expecting every other subgroup to be 
following the original set of baseline rules and procedures. In the skies above Northern Iraq, 
two fighter planes shot down two friendly helicopters while a crew of AWACS controllers 
looked on. On the other hand, the assumption that others will follow the formal rules is a 
rational one, and the best that any member of the organization can do. 
The final part of the cycle in Figure 1, transitioning from quadrant 4 back to quadrant 1 
represents a redesign of the organization to prevent the accident from ever happening again. 
However, the danger is that in an attempt to remedy every possible cause of the accident, the 
result is to overshoot, burdening the organization with even more complex rules and 
procedures, thus setting the stage for a new turn of the cycle. As Perrow puts it, “[t]he tighter 
the rules, the greater the potential for sizable practical drift to occur as the inevitable influence 
of local tasks takes hold” (p. 201). 
The theories of Perrow and Snook provide an interesting framework with which to 
analyse the risks and vulnerabilities exhibited by software systems. We have seen that the 
complexity of software system is comparable to that of the industrial systems studied by 
Perrow. I intend to show that the dynamics of software development organizations can be 
compared to that of the military organizations studied by Snook. Armed with these theories, 
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we are ready to meet the software professionals producing complex software systems and 
investigate to what extent their organizations are subject to practical drift, what social factors 
contribute to this process, and whether this affects the vulnerability of the software. 
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3 Software Development: Pleasure or Pain? 
3.1 Introduction 
Considering the hyper-modern, high-tech world that software developers inhabit, it is perhaps 
surprising that personal skills play a crucial role in their work life. Developers judge 
themselves and others on the basis of craftsmanship and dedication to their job. Most of them 
will emphasize that computer programming is as much an art as a craft, involving high levels 
of creativity and the occasional stroke of genius. Ironically, while software developers 
produce tools that will make the work life of others more automated and less dependent on 
individual skills, their own work is still labour-intensive and dependant on the knowledge and 
skill of each developer. The software professional has much in common with the medieval 
stonemason, who used his superior skill to fashion great cathedrals out of stone. Software 
developers may work with more intangible materials, but like the great artisans of the Middle 
Ages, the software developers take great pride in their work, experiencing immense pleasure 
when they see great structures rising from humble building blocks; but also great pain when 
the results of painstaking work crumble before their eyes. 
3.2 Two Companies – Two Contexts 
In order to gather empirical data to form a basis for research into social and organizational 
factors influencing the work of software developers, I interviewed 12 software professionals 
in two companies based in Oslo, Norway. One, Telenor Mobile, is a large mobile 
telecommunications company where the software systems are an integral part of a larger 
operation. The other, FIRM, is a smaller company that markets and sells its own Internet-
based market research software. These two companies are described in the following.  
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3.2.1 Telenor Mobile 
Telenor Mobile10 is the largest Norwegian mobile telecommunications operator. It is a 
subsidiary of Telenor, the successor to the state-owned telecommunications monopoly. 
Telenor is still the dominant telecommunications provider in Norway and is listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, as well as the NASDAQ Stock Market in the U.S. Telenor Mobile has about 
2.3 million customers11, the vast majority subscribers to its GSM digital mobile telephone 
services, which have been in operation since 1994. Data about these customers are stored in 
several computer systems, ranging from mainframe systems to modern database systems. 
Some of these systems date back several decades while others are recent developments. The 
systems represent a wide range of hardware and software platforms.  
The data stored about customers include information about phone calls that form the 
basis for billing the customers, as well as data pertaining to the telecommunication services 
and products that the customers subscribe to. These could be voice mail, short message 
services (SMS), WAP, e-mail, fax services, etc. Some data could be stored in several places at 
once, creating a potential for inconsistent data across different systems. These data need to be 
accessed in a variety of ways, by different organizational units within Telenor Mobile, by 
different computer systems and in different contexts. For instance, data about telephone usage 
need to be accessed by the billing systems in order to produce the quarterly telephone bill. 
The same data may have to be accessed by the customer service department when a customer 
calls in to complain about the size of the bill. When a customer wants to add a new service to 
her subscription, she could do this by calling customer service or do it through a web interface 
on the Internet. 
                                                 
10 Web site: http://www.tmc.telenor.com
11 Norway has approximately 4.5 million inhabitants, making more than half of the population Telenor 
Mobile customers. 
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The development of new products and services is seen as essential in order to maintain 
customer satisfaction and to keep Telenor Mobile’s reputation as one of the world’s most 
technologically advanced mobile telecom providers. This means that new products and 
services are constantly being developed in order to provide the customers with what are 
termed “value-added services”, i.e. services that add value to the customers’ mobile 
subscriptions beyond basic voice communication. 
In order to satisfy the needs of a range of different client applications to access data 
dispersed over a multitude of different computer systems, Telenor Mobile has established a 
so-called middleware layer within its computer system architecture. The middleware layer 
forms a well-known interface for client applications (collectively known as channels), hiding 
the complexities of accessing customer data from the so-called backend systems. By 
abstracting the process of communicating with the backend systems, channels can be 
developed without detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the middleware layer and the 
backend systems. Conversely, the backend systems can be developed and maintained without 
specific knowledge about the channels. From the client applications’ view, the middleware 
layer and backend systems form a “black box” that is understood only by its external interface 
defined by its input and output data. The responsibility for developing this middleware is in 
the hands of a dedicated section of the IT department of Telenor. This middleware section 
consists of around 20 project managers, software architects, software developers, and testers. 
In order to do their job, the architects and developers have to communicate with managers, 
marketing people, and other software professionals developing channels and backend 
systems. I conducted personal interviews with the head of this department and 7 of the 
developers who are responsible for developing and maintaining the middleware. 
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3.2.2 FIRM 
Future Information Research Management (FIRM)12 was founded in 1996. Bjørn Haugland, 
the founder of the company, had previously founded one of the most successful market 
research companies in Norway. He felt that the emerging Internet technology could be used to 
revolutionize the market research industry by automating a lot of the manual work involved in 
putting together questionnaires, collecting responses, tabulating data, and producing reports. 
Response data could instead be easily collected by using World Wide Web technologies and 
Internet questionnaires. FIRM’s main software product, ConfirmIT, allows customers to 
produce online surveys using a 100 % web-based application. Application areas for the 
product include market research studies, customer feedback and employee satisfaction 
surveys. Feedback data is immediately accessible through an online reporting tool; a huge 
improvement from the weeks needed to code and tabulate data with traditional methods. 
FIRM’s clients include some of the largest market research companies in the world, as well as 
a number of global corporations. FIRM is currently a privately held company with offices in 
Oslo, Stockholm, London, New York and San Francisco. 
Working for a relatively new, upstart company, FIRM’s developers have the luxury of 
being able to employ the latest technologies at their disposal. They do not have to deal with a 
legacy of old systems and technologies, but can gain a competitive advantage by using 
“cutting edge” tools and systems. This fact is actively used both in marketing and recruiting, 
and attracts developers with a desire to work with the latest “toys.” Development of the 
ConfirmIT product is done in Oslo by a team of 14 software developers, 5 of whom were 
interviewed during the work with this thesis. 
                                                 
12 Web site: http://www.firmglobal.com
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3.2.3 Contexts for Software Development 
The two companies, Telenor Mobile and FIRM, provide interesting contrasts as well as 
similarities. The developers at each of the companies are remarkably similar in terms of age 
and background and they all have software development as their primary job tasks. The 
contexts in which they perform these tasks differ, however. 
 The most conspicuous difference between Telenor Mobile and FIRM is in their size. 
Telenor Mobile with its 1600 employees is a large company by Norwegian standards, and is 
in turn part of the Telenor Group, a multinational corporation with interests in 16 countries 
and more than 14,000 employees in Norway alone. Telenor Mobile’s activities span a wide 
range of different products and services associated with providing mobile telephony, e.g. 
operating the network infrastructure and marketing mobile services. Software development is 
just a small part of the activities within Telenor Mobile, and the middleware department the 
interviewees were drawn from, is a small section within the larger ICT staff. Consequently, 
the developers have several layers of management to deal with, and will rarely have any 
contact with the top executives of the company. 
FIRM, on the other hand, is a much smaller company with about 40 employees in Oslo 
and about 60 worldwide. It is centred on the development, marketing and sale of the 
ConfirmIT software product, making software development its core activity. Although FIRM 
has offices in several countries, the bulk of the software development is done by the 14 
member development team in Oslo. Since the development of software is FIRM’s raison 
d’être, developers enjoy a relatively high status within the company. The whole of the Oslo 
office is located on one floor, making the work environment intimate and informal. 
 Another important area where the two companies differ is their relationship with the 
users of their software. The middleware software developed at Telenor Mobile does not have 
end-users in the normal sense; the “users” of the software are other computer programs that 
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treat the middleware as “black-box” functionality providing basic services that can be 
combined to provide higher order services for end-users such as mobile telephony customers. 
The software developed by the developers interviewed at Telenor Mobile does not have the 
kind of user interface we normally associate with computer programs, where human operators 
can interact with the systems using a screen and keyboard. This does not mean that the 
middleware developers do not have to relate to any users, however. There are still 
“customers” that request functionality and from whom requirements have to be elicited. 
The developers at FIRM have a different relationship to their users since they develop 
an Internet-based application that will be used by human end-users. A complex graphical user 
interface (GUI) forms the boundary between the computer system and the person operating it.  
The developers will therefore have to take into account the fact that the systems will be used 
by people with varying degrees of computer skills. Some of the end-users are known at the 
time of development, but most of them will use the system after it is developed and put into 
production. The end-users will be highly skilled in the application domain of the application, 
in this case market research, most probably surpassing the software developers’ insights into 
the same area. 
These companies provide interesting case studies, as they afford us a glimpse into the 
world of the professional software developers. By interviewing people heavily involved in the 
practice of creating software, we can gain insights into their social world and see which 
factors influence the vulnerabilities of the software they produce. Having developers from 
two different companies and two different contexts allows us to investigate whether these 
differences affect the vulnerabilities of their respective software products. Similarities can 
also be important, as they hint to important issues that can provide a basis for further research 
and theory building. 
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3.3 Practical Drift in Software Development Organizations 
In order to apply Snook’s theory of practical drift to software systems, we need to look at the 
conditions under which these are developed. Recall Figure 1 on page 33, which illustrates 
Snook’s theory. The starting point is quadrant 1, with an organization that is created on the 
drawing board. Rules and regulations are defined to cope with the most tightly coupled 
situation imaginable and covering all situations foreseen by the designers. In a software 
engineering organization, we can compare this to the processes and organizational setup 
prescribed by a plan-oriented software process such as the Unified Software Development 
Process (Jacobson et al., 1999).  The transition to quadrant 2 would be starting a software 
development project following the process to the letter. According to Snook’s theory, this will 
be an unstable state of affairs since the rules are designed for a tightly coupled organizational 
set-up, but in most cases this will be “overkill” when it comes to the actual situation. We 
would expect the rule-oriented behaviour to be replaced by a task-oriented behaviour as 
individuals and subgroups within the organization pragmatically adjust their actions to be 
more in tune with the practical demands of the tasks at hand. These adjustments will in 
practice contribute to “practical drift” away from the baseline of rules and methods prescribed 
by the process. When attempting to establish whether practical drift occurs in software 
development organizations and the possible sources of such drift, we need to look at three 
areas. First, whether methods and processes in fact contribute to the overall quality of 
software, and thus a lower degree of vulnerability. Secondly, we need to establish which 
forces can contribute to practical drift during software development. Finally, we have to 
investigate how this can have a detrimental effect on the software produced. 
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3.4 Software Methods and Processes 
Compared to other engineering discipline, the construction of software has a short history. 
Modern computers arose from code breaking efforts in the U.K. and U.S. during World War 
II. When computing was still in its infancy, the distinction between hardware and software 
was blurred. Programming the computer consisted of toggling switched on the computer’s 
console or feeding it punched cards with instructions in binary machine code. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s the first programming languages that were independent of a specific 
computer started to appear, and so software development became a separate task. Due to the 
still limited capacities of the hardware, computer programs were short, designed for specific 
tasks, and offered limited possibilities for human input. Each piece of software was developed 
for use in a specific location and usually developed by in-house programmers. Most software 
was “batch programs” which ran overnight without user intervention. 
Fuelled by advances in solid-state physics, semiconductors, and electronics, the power 
and capabilities of digital computers increased exponentially in the post-war decades. As the 
computers grew smaller, faster, and more powerful, they got better facilities for user 
interaction and demanded new kinds of software. It soon became clear that the software could 
not keep up with the advances in hardware in terms of performance and reliability. Relative 
costs of software when compared to hardware soared; experienced software developers were 
hard to find; and the few who existed were not able to keep up with the demands for 
increasingly complex software as the computer constantly found new applications in 
government, the military, and private companies. The existing tools and programming 
languages proved to be inadequate for the new tasks that had to be solved if the new 
computers were to realise their full potential. Software development projects were more often 
than not fraught with enormous delays and cost overruns. The resulting software was often 
faulty, poorly documented and almost impossible to understand and maintain by others than 
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the original developers. This situation sparked an intense effort within research communities 
to come up with solutions to what was dubbed the “software crisis” by the end of the 1960s. 
 This marked the birth of the software engineering field. It was felt that the practice of 
software development should be modelled on other engineering disciplines, like civil 
engineering (i.e. building houses, bridges, roads, dams, etc.), mechanical engineering, and 
even computer hardware engineering. These practices had proven successful in taking 
activities that were once crafts based heavily on personal skills and turning them into 
predictable, scientifically based disciplines capable of forming the basis for industrial 
production. By dividing software development into independent tasks and prescribing 
systematic procedures for structuring and producing the programming code itself (methods); 
for structuring the interaction between developers, managers, customers and users in 
predictable and quantifiable processes; as well as prescribing which artefacts (documents and 
program code) should be produced during the development process, it was believed that 
software development would become every bit as predictable and manageable as the other 
engineering disciplines. Consequently, a lot of effort has been put into creating methods and 
processes for software development in the last decades. The perhaps best known and most 
influential of the so-called plan-oriented approaches is the Unified Software Development 
Process (USDP13) (Jacobson et al., 1999). Other important software development processes 
include the Dynamic Systems Development Process (DSDM) (http://www.dsdm.com) and 
Extreme Programming (XP) (Newkirk & Martin, 2001). 
 Most of these processes rely on dividing the software development activities into 
phases with specific tasks, timeframes and milestone artefacts for each phase, modelled on 
the phases of for instance a bridge construction project. The classic phases of software 
                                                 
13 Perhaps better known in its commercial incarnation as the Rational Unified Process (RUP), 
developed by the Rational Corporation, now a part of IBM. See http://www.rational.com for more 
information. 
48 
engineering are analysis, where feasibility studies are performed and requirements are 
gathered from users and other stakeholders; design, with detailed planning about how the 
system is going to be programmed; construction, where the actual programming and testing is 
performed and documentation is written; and deployment, where the finished system is 
installed for use in its target location. Along with maintenance, which covers systems 
management and service after deployment, these phases are referred to as a system’s lifecycle.  
 Software methods and processes can be said to be strict or rigid if they contain 
detailed descriptions of the content of the phases, tasks and artefacts to be produced, 
prescribing checklists and procedures for error reporting, code review and other activities that 
are not directly related to programming. Such rigid processes purport to result in predictable 
software development projects by mimicking the processes that have proven effective in 
industrial production; in effect leaving little to the discretion of the individual developer. 
Many early processes prescribed strict separation of these phases, especially between the 
analysis and design phases on one hand and the construction phase on the other. It was felt 
that by having specially trained systems architects and designers analyse and divide the 
development tasks into independent subtasks that could be handled by individual 
programmers, previous problems with unstructured, unmaintainable code produced when 
programmers were left to their own devices could be avoided. This would in effect 
concentrate all the creative, analytical work to the analysis and design phases, leaving only 
menial, routine work to the programmers. 
 Neither Telenor Mobile nor FIRM can be said to employ rigid processes or methods. 
In fact, neither company uses any specific, named process, but both have developed their own 
processes based on ideas from the more influential methodologies mentioned above. The 
managers see it as important to have processes that are internalized and actually used by the 
developers. If the processes do not gain approval from the developers, they run the risk of 
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becoming “shelfware:” binders of irrelevant documents gathering dust on a shelf. Both 
companies have developed software tools that support their processes, containing flowcharts 
and checklists guiding the developers through each step in the process. The companies also 
constantly try to improve their processes through regular evaluations. It is also a goal to 
standardize the processes used; for Telenor Mobile across different departments and sections; 
for FIRM across offices in different countries. FIRM is perhaps the company which has seen 
the greatest change in attitude towards methods in recent years. Starting from scratch with 
only a handful of developer in 1996, the emphasis was more on creativity and speed in 
reaching the market with a new product, and less on establishing processes for software 
development. As the company grew and more developers got involved, it became clear that 
formal processes were needed to create a more predictable work atmosphere for the 
developers; to meet customers’ demands and expectations; and to increase the quality of the 
software itself. FIRM has therefore cooperated with software engineering and process quality 
researchers in order to develop a tailor-made development process. They now employ a 
flexible approach to software development. The overarching process can be tailored to the 
size and demands of each individual project, providing the developers with a range of 
processes to choose from. A simple change in some internal system functionality might be 
done “ad hoc”, i.e. without any formal measures; while development of a customized feature 
for a big client will be done with all the checks and safeguards in place. 
 The interviewees at both companies agreed that methods and processes are necessary 
in order to produce quality software. Especially in contexts where extreme reliability is 
needed, such as space exploration and telephone exchange software, developers saw strict 
adherence to methods as crucial. We can safely conclude that employing strict rules and 
regulations in the form of software processes and methods are viewed as essential in order to 
produce highly reliable software, both by software engineering researchers and practitioners 
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in the field. Much like the military operations studied by Snook, a software development 
project is set up to achieve a specified objective by following an initial set of global rules. It 
has a limited timeframe and a clearly defined “chain of command.” 
Having shown the relevance of Snook’s theory, we know turn to some of these factors 
that contribute to the drift away from the processes and methods of the software development 
project as it is designed on the drawing board, focusing on four main issues: pleasure and 
control, mental models, production pressures, and fragmentation of responsibility. 
3.5 Pleasures in Technology 
Developers clearly value their skills and independence, and see too strict methods as boring 
and stifling creativity. As developer Knut says when talking about his experiences with 
previous employers:  
The consultancy business was rigid, very rigid. And I think that will sometimes 
be at the expense of enjoyment and creativity. You are in a way sitting like a 
robot in such a system, just sitting and producing something. That’s a large part 
of the reason why I left the consultancy industry.14  
Low and Woolgar found similar sentiments in their participant observation among software 
developers. One developer, William, 
spent a good deal of his time yawning and sitting slumped, staring into his 
computer screen … To him, the structure was overwhelming. The amount of 
written documentation that was required, the proliferation of structured 
documents set out in the CASE [Computer Aided Software Engineering] tool 
that he had to use, the deliberate sequence of work that he was supposed to 
follow. And all seemed to produce in him a defeated lethargy. (Low & 
Woolgar, 1993, p. 41, original emphasis).  
                                                 
14 Interview K. M. Hansen, developer Telenor Mobile, Oslo: June 18, 2003. 
   51 
Issues of pleasure and enjoyment seem to be a crucial factor for software developers. All the 
developers interviewed reported that feelings of pleasure and enjoyment were important 
motivating factors in their day-to-day work life. Most software developers see their job as an 
art as much as a craft, and the creative parts of the work, such as analysis and design, are 
especially valued. Some of the developers also reported taking enormous pleasure in the 
actual coding work; like Daniel, who has had periods of working very long hours because the 
job tasks have been “fun.” When performing programming tasks he “can maintain an 
incredible work capacity without burning out.”15 This echoes the software professionals 
studied by Tine Kleif and Wendy Faulkner (2003). They found the same pleasures in software 
development and absorption in technical tasks. In that sense, the data gathered by 
interviewing software developers at Telenor Mobile and FIRM are remarkably similar to the 
results of Kleif and Faulkner’s studies of hobbyist robot builders and professional software 
engineers. Creativity was mentioned by most of the developers as contributing to the fun and 
pleasure of software development. As Daniel puts it: 
What’s fun is the creative part. It’s either being architect, designing and 
working with concepts; or just programming, if you believe in what you are 
making.16
The pleasure seems to be derived from using one’s technical skills in making something that 
works. Solving a problem in an especially efficient and elegant way is commonly associated 
with being a “hacker”, a term denoting someone with an exceptional aptitude for 
programming and with immense pride and joy in his skills. The aesthetic dimension of 
programming seems to be important for a self-confessed hacker like Peter: 
                                                 
15 Interview D. Bakkelund, developer Telenor Mobil, Oslo: June 16, 2003. 
16 Ibid. 
52 
Q: Do you feel pleasure when programming? 
A: Yes! Yes, and that’s connected to the hacker thing, that it feels good in your 
soul, in a way, if I’m able to do something that’s beautiful. Absolutely.17
Or as Steinar puts it: 
I think the analysis and design part of the job is the most fun. Finding the 
solution to an intricate problem using software, doing it in an elegant way, 
preferably by using patterns … Putting together things you know from before, 
like structures, that is fun.18
Another recurring theme that crops up when asking the developers about their work, concerns 
issues of control and ownership. As Kleif and Faulkner suggest, technology in general and 
software in particular provides an arena for power and control and for overcoming 
uncertainties. The feeling of control seems to be a requisite for enjoying a task. As Steinar 
puts it when asked about the less enjoyable aspects of work: 
[W]hen you’re not in control of the system you’re supposed to work with …   
that’s probably the least satisfactory of what I work with now, because you can 
be struggling with an error that turns out not to be yours for quite some time … 
That can be frustrating. [Emphasis added]19
Rasmussen and Håpnes (1991) also found an astonishing fascination with computers and 
programming in their study of computer science students. An all-male group of 
“programming virtuosos” shunned classes and professors’ assignments, choosing instead to 
sit all night at computer terminals experimenting and “work[ing] for the joy of the process 
and the grand feeling of achieving control” (p. 1111). Again there is an emphasis on the 
feeling of control as the main motivator and source of pleasure. However, among the 
developers at Telenor Mobile and FIRM, no evidence was found that indicated that the people 
                                                 
17 Interview P. Myklebust, director of development FIRM, Oslo: June 23, 2003. 
18 Interview S. Lundeberg, developer Telenor Mobil, Oslo: June 13, 2003. 
19 Ibid. 
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taking pleasure in technology are people that feel less powerful and unable to cope with 
uncertainties in other areas of life, as Kleif and Faulkner seem to believe. None of the 
interviewees conformed to the stereotypical “nerd” image of the computer professional. 
The developers clearly distinguish between tasks that are enjoyable or “fun” and those 
that are less so. As we have seen, tasks that allow developers to employ their creativity and 
exercise control are considered fun. Routine and repetitive tasks where the developer is not in 
total control are seen as boring or “not fun.” Tasks that fall in the latter category are typically 
software testing, i.e. systematically exercising software modules or subsystems to ensure that 
they conform to requirements and do not fail or produce incorrect results. Estimating, i.e. 
trying to assess the time and resources needed to implement a certain task, is seen as an 
especially joyless task. This is probably due to the high level of uncertainty involved and the 
lack of control felt by the developer given the task of predicting future resource needs and 
timelines. Importantly, estimating and testing are recognized as the most crucial in increasing 
software quality and lowering vulnerability. Incorrect estimates are seen as the source of 
unrealistic deadlines and production pressures; and “testing is the only way of really getting 
rid of bugs in your software,” as Daniel points out20. 
An important question is therefore whether the developers let the “fun factor” 
influence how well they perform these important tasks. Daniel admits that 
Developers are … not exactly immature and childish, but a bit like, you try all 
the time to adjust so you have fun. Most people working here … think 
programming is very fun, and so you try to sneak out of the things you don’t 
think is fun.21
Writing proper technical documentation to aid in future maintenance of the software is also a 
crucial task that is seen as menial. Rodin feels that  
                                                 
20 Interview D. Bakkelund, June 16, 2003. 
21 Ibid. 
54 
Good developers are a special type of people and many of them hate [writing] 
documentation. Often it’s the best [developers] that hate [writing] 
documentation, those who write the best code.22
While all the developers emphasize that they do not shirk their responsibilities even though 
some of their work tasks may feel less enjoyable, most agreed that the level of fun associated 
with a task will definitely influence how much work goes into it, and ultimately affect the 
quality of the software. The general feeling towards these tasks is a “get-it-over-with 
attitude,” as Steinar calls it.23
 It is worth noting that a majority of the developers were not trained in computer 
science or software engineering, but has strayed into the field from mathematics and other 
engineering disciplines, often after doing programming as part of the work within their 
original fields. This suggests that development work attracts people with specific personality 
traits and perhaps with a special aptitude for this kind of work. Whether this makes them 
especially prone to the factors discussed here, is an interesting avenue for further research. 
3.6 Mental Models 
While a fascination with the computer and a sense of joy in controlling it can be an asset for a 
software developer, helping him funnel his skills and creativity into his software, it can also 
be a source of pain. The sheltered environment of the university computer lab is rarely the 
norm in the professional work place. The software developer’s intimate knowledge of the 
machine and its ordered world can be an obstacle when communicating with other groups 
involved in the development process. I propose that this is largely due to different mental 
models. 
                                                 
22 Interview R. Lie, systems architect/developer Telenor Mobil, Oslo: June 20, 2003. 
23 Interview S. Lundeberg, June 13, 2003. 
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Paul Edwards (1996) suggests that much of the fascination felt by computing 
professionals stems from the simulated character of the “microworlds” they create and the 
omnipotent power and control the programmer can wield there (pp. 171-172). In order to 
build a computer program that is supposed to interact with human beings and assist them, the 
software developer will have to build a mental model of the relevant aspects of the real word. 
Due to the nature of computers and software, such a model will have to be based on the 
reductionist and deterministic principles that govern computers. The model must be “stripped 
of both social and emotional complexity” (Kleif & Faulkner, 2003, p. 313). This means that 
every aspect of the mental model will have to be spelled out and follow deterministically from 
the principles, rules and laws governing the microworld contained in the software system. No 
aspect of the software system can be left vague or open to interpretation. There is no latitude 
for social factors or human idiosyncrasies outside the mechanical workings of a positivist 
world. To put it bluntly, there is no room for constructivism inside a computer program. 
Regardless of whether one subscribes to theories of social constructivism or not, it does not 
require a stretch of the imagination to see that the intricacies of the real world tend to get lost 
when forced into a computer system; and the social complexities particularly so. Software 
developers, like other engineers, have been drilled in analytic and problem solving and tend to 
“perceive the world of mechanisms and machinery as embodying mathematical and physical 
principles alone” (Bocciarelli, 1994, as cited in Kleif & Faulkner, 2003, p. 313). 
 Gorman & Carlson (1990) use the concept of mental models when investigating the 
cognitive processes involved in technical innovation, using the development of the telephone 
by Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison as case studies. They borrow the term from 
cognitive scientists who use it to describe “the models people have of themselves, others, the 
environment, and the things with which they interact.” (Norman, 1988, as cited in Gorman & 
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Carlson, 1990, pp. 134-135). Of course inventors and software developers are not the only 
ones to construct a mental model of a given system: 
[T]hrough interaction with a target system, people formulate mental models of 
that system. These models need not be technically accurate … but they must be 
functional. A person, through interaction with the system, will continue to 
modify the mental model in order to get a workable result. Mental models will 
be constrained by various factors such as the user’s technical background, 
previous experience with similar systems, and the structure of the human 
information processing system (Norman, 1983, pp. 7-8).  
It is clear that different people with different background coming in contact with a computer 
system will have widely differing mental models of how the system works, what it is capable 
of doing, and what it takes to change it. The developers of a system possess intimate 
knowledge of the technical foundations and the assumptions behind it. Their managers, often 
without a technical background, see the system in terms of the time and resources needed to 
build it, as well as the requirements and constraints presented to them from the customer and 
other stakeholders having an interest in the system. The (present or future) users of the system 
form their mental models of it on the basis of their understanding of the real world domain, 
the user interface the systems presents them with, and the data input and output to and from 
the system. Most groups will have this “black box” view of the system, seeing it in terms of 
its external properties and behaviour. The system developers are of course the notable 
exception, with their mental models based on the inner workings of the system. This sets the 
stage for a variety of problems of communication between software developers, their 
managers and the users of the software that, as we shall see, profoundly affects the 
vulnerability of the software. 
 The concept of mental models bears striking resemblance to Bijker’s (1995) notion of 
technological frame, capturing the idea that different social groups will have different “goals, 
key problems, problem-solving strategies (heuristics), requirements to be met by problem 
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solutions, current theories, tacit knowledge, testing procedures, and design methods and 
criteria” (p.123) relating to a specific artefact. Bijker also introduces the concept of degree of 
inclusion into a technological frame, describing “to what extent the actor’s interactions are 
structured by that technological frame” (p. 143). This concept is important in analysing the 
apparent malleability or obduracy of a technological artefact, as it captures the degree of “sell-
in” of actors in a specific technological frame or mental model. As Gorman and Carlson point 
out (p. 136), the technological frame does not include their concept of mechanical 
representation (p. 141), the actual physical objects with which the inventor (developer) or user 
interacts, using them in combination with abstract ideas to address new problems. In the 
current context, mechanical representations map to the software systems under construction or 
use, or other software systems with which the developer or user has had previous experience. 
 Within software engineering research, Peter Naur (1985) has proposed that 
programming can be understood mainly as “theory building,” relating the software to its 
anticipated use. He suggests that programming “should be regarded as an activity by which 
programmers form or achieve a certain kind of insight, a theory, of the matters at hand” (p. 
253). The main task of a software developer is therefore not the production of the program 
text itself, but the understanding of the aspects of the real world that are to be modelled, 
automated or replicated, and the formation of a theory of how this can be achieved by a 
computer program. Christiane Floyd (1992) expands on this and sees software development 
as a form of reality construction where developers rather than analysing requirements 
construct them from their own perspective, affected by their personal priorities and values. 
These views of software development emphasize the active part of the programmers in the 
construction of meanings of software systems, as well as the power they have to embed their 
view of reality and the social world in the artefacts they produce. All of these related concepts 
have one thing in common, namely that they embody the insight that different individuals will 
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have different ideas and notions about a software system and how it relates to them and their 
environment. In the following, the concept of mental models will be used as basis for the 
analysis. 
Most of the developers interviewed expressed frustration with some of their project 
leaders and managers. At Telenor Mobile, most of the project leaders do not have a technical 
background, but have business or economy educations. At FIRM, with its development 
activities on a smaller scale and managers with technology backgrounds, this is less of a 
problem, even though the sentiments can be felt there as well. As Steinar has experienced, 
project leaders’ lack of technical knowledge can be problematic, especially when eliciting 
requirements: 
I have seen on several occasions that they haven’t quite been able to catch what 
is important because they are not technologists. So I believe that … there has to 
be technical personnel participating all the way from the start of any project, 
it’s a problem if you don’t.24
Otherwise, you risk “in the worst case [delivering] to the customer something they actually 
didn’t ask for. That has occurred.”25
Communicating with existing and potential users of their software can also be a source 
of frustration for a developer. Rodin puts it like this: 
                                                 
24 Interview S. Lundeberg, June 13, 2003. 
25 Ibid. 
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I have learned that it is incredibly difficult for a non-computer person to 
understand that it can be so damned difficult. They just can’t comprehend that 
it can be so difficult, it’s just a box with some stuff on the screen, it can’t 
possibly be so difficult to do. They can’t understand it. The times I have tried 
to work on this, I see that with a few exceptions it’s often easier for me to get 
into their problem formulation than the other way around … For developers, 
users are a nuisance.26
Even communicating and cooperating with fellow developers can pose problems. Due to the 
complexity and intractability of software, developers who have not been directly involved in 
programming a specific piece of software will most often take a black box view of other 
developers’ work. 
At the bottom of these communicative problems are the different mental models that 
developers, managers, and users form of the system. It seems to be exceedingly difficult for 
people with different mental models of a system to find common ground and cooperate. 
Developers feel, perhaps justly, that their intimate knowledge of the system gives them a 
privileged insight. They seem to resist seeing the world from other people’s viewpoint and 
ascribe the difficulties in communications to the lack of technical insights and interest in 
managers and users. In Bijker’s (1995) parlance, their inclusion in their respective 
technological frames is too high for effective communication and cooperation. Each group 
struggles to make its technological frame or mental model the dominant one. This might be an 
especially painful struggle for the software developers. As Undheim (2002) found in his 
fieldwork among Telenor engineers, in the struggle between marketing people, managers and 
engineers, the engineers did not have the power or the “symbolic vocabulary to infect others” 
(p. 119), choosing instead to remain “silent”. The engineers were left in their purely technical 
domain “wondering what is going on, and both parties ironise over the incompetence of the 
other” (p. 117). 
                                                 
26 Interview R. Lie, June 20, 2003. 
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Both Telenor Mobile and FIRM employ people who specialise in bridging the gap 
between customers and users who provide the requirements and functional specifications for 
the software, and the software developers who are given the task of developing the system. 
These are people with the ability to see things from several groups’ viewpoint simultaneously, 
moving from one technological frame to the other. Usually these “bridge builders” are 
developers, probably because the “technical” mental models or frames are difficult to enter 
without the knowledge and experience of a software developer. Rodin sees himself as a 
bridge builder: 
I think it’s very difficult to realise what it’s like not to understand [what it is 
like to be an ordinary user] … [It’s] very difficult to realise how it is not to 
know something when you know it [yourself] … [Bridge builders] are people 
… who understand that the world is more than programming.27
Still, this gap between the developers and the non-technical stakeholders is probably the 
largest cause of vulnerable software. When customers are unable to formulate their 
requirements for a new system in such a way that developers can understand them and 
translate them into a form suitable for inclusion into a computer system, and developers are 
unable to communicate with the customers in order to understand how the software they are 
building will be used in a real world setting, the risk of ending up with software that is not 
used the way it is intended increases dramatically. As we saw in the case of the London 
Ambulance Service, this type of vulnerabilities can have grave consequences, as users 
struggle to make the software work in their world. The manner in which designers and 
engineers “inscribe” their ideas and notions into an artefact based on their assumptions about 
the potential users and their world has been described by Akrich (1993). She introduces the 
concept of “scripts” to indicate this idea. Software developers are thus able to “inscribe” the 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
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software systems with “scripts” representing their world views and ideas about the 
prospective users of the system.28 Wyatt (1998) argues that the malleability and flexibility of 
the computer is illusory; in order for the technology to be used; “malleability has to be 
excluded during the process of development” (p. 6). The constraints on the users of a 
particular software system are therefore considerable and not easily changed. 
3.7 Production Pressures 
The software development team is usually supervised by a project leader whose job it is to 
establish the team, secure resources, plan the execution of the software development project, 
divide the project into subtasks, compile estimates, communicate with stakeholders, and 
monitor progress as the project moves along. As mentioned previously, many developers see 
project leaders’ lack of technical skills as a source of frustration, causing problems of 
communication. We have also seen that the developers admit to giving the task of estimating 
a low priority, due to its perceived joylessness. A project leader without a technical 
background will have no independent basis for assuring the quality of the estimates he 
receives from the developers. Added to the fact that estimating software projects is 
notoriously difficult due to the large number of uncertainties involved, it is no wonder that 
correct estimates are something of a rarity in most software projects. Notoriously, estimates 
seem invariably to undershoot the actual effort needed for a specific task. 
 Incorrect estimates thus usually mean unrealistic deadlines. For project leaders and 
managers, a lot could be at stake by not keeping the forecasted deadlines. Customers may 
have been promised completion of a project within a specific date and may have based their 
own activities on this; in Telenor Mobile’s case, a large marketing campaign for a new 
                                                 
28 Although an actor-network theorist, Akrich emphasises the ideas and worldview of the designers 
being built into an artefact and adding to its obduracy (Hommels, 2001, p. 38; p. 169). The relevance 
to the present discussion is clear. 
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product may have been scheduled involving TV and newspaper commercials, making a 
missed deadline unbearable. All of this adds up to a tremendous pressure to keep deadlines 
and finish software modules within the estimated times. As Daniel says: 
I have often handed off software I felt could have used one more week of 
[work] … [The code] that you hand off is very chaotic, because of the time 
pressure you just about manage to cram in the functionality you need and then 
you don’t have time to clean up afterwards to make it maintainable. It’s like, 
just chaos.29
The consequences in terms of reliability and maintainability of the software should be 
obvious. Most of the developers feel that it is the testing of the software once it is coded that 
suffers the most under tight deadlines. Testing is the last task before a piece of software is 
regarded as completed, and is usually the place where the pressure of the deadline is felt most 
acutely. As Rodin says, when the developers are not given enough time to do testing properly, 
“What happens is that you test the best scenario or the things you know will work. Then you 
don’t get to test all the failure scenarios and once [the program encounters a situation] outside 
the norm, it blows up.”30 Developer Per explains why this happens: 
                                                 
29 Interview D. Bakkelund, June 16, 2003. 
30 Interview R. Lie, June 20, 2003. 
   63 
Q: Does it occur that deadlines are set that make the quality of [the software] 
suffer? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Why is that? 
A: Well, it’s the business side who wants things out there, and who feels that 
everything is too slow and puts enormous pressure [on the developers], sells 
things before they’re [done], sells things to a deadline that [is nonnegotiable]. 
… 
Q: Do you feel that they lack understanding of the fact that it can take time 
because you have to maintain quality and security? 
A: Yes. Yes, absolutely.31
Again we see that the “silent engineers” (Undheim, 2002) are left to do their best within the 
confines of their technical domain. As Diane Vaughan found in her investigation into the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster (1996), a culture of institutionalized production pressure can 
be dangerous for an organization dealing with complex systems (pp. xii-xiv). At NASA, it 
played a major role in the tragic outcome of the shuttle launch; at Telenor Mobile or other 
software development organizations, it can lead to faulty software being put into production 
and the consequences that entails. 
 FIRM does not seem to suffer the same degree of production pressures. Their flexible 
approach to development processes, having a range of processes to choose from according to 
the scale of the project at hand, seems to yield beneficial results. Their experience with the 
different development processes, the ConfirmIT system and the application domain also 
enables them to produce more precise estimates, thus avoiding much of the production 
pressure. Although I am not able to draw any definite conclusions on the basis of the present 
material, I would expect that this leads to more reliable software, since the time spent on 
testing and quality assurance does not suffer to the same degree. 
                                                 
31 Interview P. Hustad, systems architect/developer Telenor Mobile, Oslo: June 16, 2003. 
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3.8 Fragmentation of Responsibility 
Although software testing is seen as crucial in order to ensure that the software is as bug-free 
as possible, both Telenor Mobile and FIRM employ additional strategies in order to achieve 
high quality software. A process of peer code review, where one developer’s code is inspected 
by another developer is seen as a crucial stage in the software development process at both 
companies. However, the actual content of this stage seems to be unspecified and left to the 
individual developer performing this review, or QA (quality assurance) as it is called at 
Telenor Mobile. As with other tasks that do not directly produce code, it is at risk of being 
taken more lightly when the pressure is on to reach a tight deadline. Interestingly, the 
perception of the skill of the person whose work is up for review, versus the skill of the 
reviewer, can play a factor in determining how thorough the task is done, as Steinar 
volunteers: 
Q: Could it be that you take [QA] less seriously if you’re in a hurry? 
A: That could happen. Or if you have a lot of confidence in the person who 
made the code. That’s also a factor. 
Q: Right. So if you’re assigned to do QA on the work of someone you consider 
being very skilled, it could be that you just assume that it works? 
A: Yes, that’s a factor. I would probably do that if I was pressed for time, for 
instance, and … it was important to get this done, then I would be prone to go 
more lightly at it than if it was someone I didn’t know … who made that 
code.32
Daniel confirms this; “It depends on who [wrote the code]. If it’s someone I know is very 
good, then I might not go in depth, I would just look it over.”33
 Consequently, in a stressed situation the important QA steps could be taken very 
lightly, based on the perceived skill of a developer. It is not hard to imagine that a developer 
                                                 
32 Interview S. Lundeberg, June 13, 2003. 
33 Interview D. Bakkelund, June 16, 2003. 
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who is reviewing code written by a developer with greater perceived skills will be hard 
pressed to raise a warning over code he does not understand, but simply assume that 
everything will work. This could in turn let serious errors slip through one of the few quality 
assurance measures, thus increasing the vulnerability of the software. It is also debateable 
whether errors and other shortcomings actually can be adequately identified simply by 
inspecting the textual program code of a piece of software. 
 Software bugs, i.e. logical flaws that result in program crash or faulty data, are always 
at the forefront of developers’ attention, simply because their presence cannot be ignored. As 
discussed previously, bugs are not the only cause of vulnerabilities in software. Other issues 
concerning security and privacy are also important when assessing the vulnerability of a 
software system. However, among the developers interviewed, these issues seemed absent 
from their daily concerns. As Daniel puts it, “security is a neglected area within software 
development, mostly, and [there is] very little knowledge [about security issues] among 
developers. There’s very little time and focus on it from management.”34 It can again be 
argued that the lack of technical skills and knowledge among project leaders and managers 
prevents them from recognizing the dangers of security and privacy flaws, much less 
implementing countermeasures. It is to a large extent left to the individual developer to ensure 
that such flaws do not exist in the software when it is put into use. 
In much the same way that Snook found that important issues risk being neglected due 
to diffuse responsibility (2000, pp. 119-121), it seems clear that the majority of the developers 
feel that the responsibility for ensuring security and privacy lie elsewhere. Daniel says that 
concerns over security are not issues in his day-to-day work, because “there’s a guy over there 
that’s responsible for security, he knows it, the rest of us just use some stuff and then it will 
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take care of itself most of the time.”35 Steinar concurs that since safety and privacy issues are 
handled by others “I don’t have to think about such things. I’m sure there are others who have 
this as their area of focus, but I don’t.”36
Considering the pressures forcing developers to take shortcuts it can only be expected 
that security and privacy vulnerabilities will find their way into the finished products. These 
types of vulnerabilities are especially insidious, since they may not surface during the normal 
operation of a computer system. Unlike bugs and other errors which normally manifest 
themselves in obvious manners, security flaws can lie dormant for years before they are 
discovered and exploited. 
3.9 The Results of Practical Drift 
I have now identified several factors that can contribute to practical drift during the 
development of software, and established that software developers will drift away from the 
strict rules of the prescribed software development process. We saw that this could have a 
detrimental effect on the quality and reliability of the software, thus increasing the 
vulnerability of the software systems produced. Although neither Telenor Mobile nor FIRM 
have strict operational rules and procedures to the same extent as a military operation, they 
both have established software development processes and methods that are meant to ensure 
the reliability of the software. To see the relevance of Snook’s theory in this context, we turn 
again to Figure 1 on page 33. The establishment of an actual software development project 
can be seen as a transition from quadrant 1 to quadrant 2, employing a baseline of rules and 
regulations. The social factors influencing the developers constitute a drift from quadrant 2 to 
quadrant 3. The software system under construction has typically been divided into modules 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Interview S. Lundeberg, June 13, 2003. 
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and subsystems, each assigned to different developers or groups of developers. According to 
Snook’s theory, each of these will have worked along with their tasks, imperceptibly drifting 
away from the baseline of process and methods; each of them, however, along different paths. 
Especially in situations where the development process feels overly restrictive, the developers 
will adapt to the demands of the practical tasks at hand, replacing the rule-based logics of 
action by task-based logics of action more suited to the environment the developers work in. 
As we have seen, the individual developers will make decisions to deviate from the rigour of 
strict methods based on what appears practical, but also according to the personal inclinations 
of the developers, emphasising those tasks that are associated with “fun.” We also saw that 
production pressures, difference in mental models, and communication barriers prompted 
developers to deviate from following procedures designed to ensure software reliability.  
 Snook predicts a rapid shift from the relative stability of quadrant 3 when the situation 
suddenly changes from a loosely coupled one to a tightly coupled one, demanding that several 
subgroups work tightly together towards a common goal. In our present context, this would be 
the stage of the software project were modules and subsystems are brought together for 
systems and integration tests, and finally putting the complete system in operation. This is 
when different parts of the system developed by different parts of the project organization are 
supposed to start interacting and working together. As we learned above, the processes 
surrounding testing and subsystem integration are especially prone to drift due to social 
factors. The relevance of Snook’s theory is clearly demonstrated, as it identifies this as a point 
where the risk of disaster is greatest and therefore demanding careful attention by developers 
and managers. 
 At Telenor Mobile and FIRM there were no stories of disasters on the same scale as 
the London Ambulance Service (LAS) case that started this thesis. Many of the developers 
could recount tales (mostly from previous employers) of potentially disastrous events only 
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averted by sheer luck or by working round the clock; or struggling to come to terms with 
hopelessly unrealistic deadlines and incompetent managers. More often than not, incidents 
like these are suppressed or forgotten and are never subjected to analysis within software 
development organizations. The fact that the LAS case was thoroughly investigated and 
analysed makes it nearly unique and provides an excellent opportunity to learn. We can find 
several of the social factors discussed here in the report from the official investigation into the 
LAS case (Page et al., 1993). The report describes how the project was supposed to use the 
PRINCE project management methodology, but “[a]lthough certain elements of the PRINCE 
methodology were used, at least in the initial stages, it was not used in a properly structured 
way through the duration of the project” (para. 3068, my emphasis). The report does not 
explicitly mention the conditions of the software developers whose task it was to build the 
CAD system, but it is clear that tremendous pressures were put on the project team to meet a 
nonnegotiable deadline for delivery of the finished system. The inquiry found that the 
company developing the software was “late in delivery of software and, largely because of the 
time pressures under which they were working, the quality of their software was often 
suspect” (para. 3079). The consequences were that tasks such as quality assurance (QA) and 
testing suffered (para. 3083-3086). Other important parts of the project methodology were 
disregarded, as software developers “in their eagerness to please users, often put through 
software changes ‘on the fly’ thus circumventing the official Project Issue Report (PIR) 
procedures whereby all such changes should be controlled … Such changes could, and did, 
introduce further bugs” (para. 3082). Communication between software developers and the 
Central Ambulance Control and other staff that were to use the CAD system was also flawed 
during design and implementation. Accordingly, “there was incomplete ‘ownership’ of the 
system by the majority of its users” (para. 1007o) leading to little participation from LAS staff 
and an expectation that the system would fail. More importantly, a lack of understanding of 
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the users’ needs and requirements led to the design of a system with “a need for perfect input 
formation in an imperfect world” (para. 4007a). The deployment of a system that did not fulfil 
user needs also led to local adaptations on the part of the users: 
[S]atisfactory implementation of the system would require changes to a number 
of working practices. Senior management believed that implementation of the 
system would, in itself, bring about these changes. In fact many staff found it 
to be an operational ‘strait jacket’ within which they still tried to operate local 
flexibility. This caused further confusion within the system (para. 1007p, my 
emphasis). 
In the LAS case, we are able to recognize many of the same social factors that were found 
among the developers at Telenor Mobile and FIRM. The factors mentioned here were by no 
means the only causes of the spectacular failure of the LAS CAD system, but they were 
certainly important in contributing to it. They provide us with a worst-case scenario of what 
practical drift can lead to in a software development organization. 
 We also saw that important differences existed between Telenor Mobile and FIRM, 
which had an influence on the vulnerability of the software produced at the respective 
companies. FIRM had a more flexible range of software development processes, thus being 
able to work with more realistic estimates and less production pressures. FIRM’s developers 
also enjoyed a higher status within the company and more power to get their worldview 
across than what was the case at Telenor Mobile, where several layers of management exist 
between them and the top executives. There are strong indications that these differences in 
social organization influence the vulnerability of the software they develop. 
 From the users’ perspective, inadequate communication with the software developers 
and conflicting mental models could lead to confusion about their requirements and to the 
development of software that does not address the needs of its users. As the LAS case so 
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brutally demonstrated, this could in turn expose further vulnerabilities both in the users and in 
the software itself. 
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4 Conclusion: Living with Vulnerability 
4.1 Summary 
We began this investigation at the London Ambulance Service and saw how a new computer 
system that was meant to make life easier for emergency staff and safer for the general 
population turned out to have the opposite effect. People’s lives came at risk due to the 
vulnerabilities of a computer system, thus exposing the vulnerabilities of human beings in a 
technological society. In the LAS case, no grave technical flaws were found in the system 
itself; in a sense it only did what it was designed to do. This is something that this incident has 
in common with many accidents from a wide range of areas involving complex technical 
systems; technical malfunction may play a role, but it is usually social or organizational 
factors that turn minor incidents into fatal accidents. On the other hand, when accidents do not 
happen, or incidents are contained before they can escalate to damaging accidents, social and 
organisational factors usually play an important role as well, contributing to less risk. 
 The research question behind this thesis was to look at how social and organizational 
factors influence the vulnerability of software systems, placing this research within the field 
of science, technology, and society (STS) studies. Employing interdisciplinary approaches, 
scholars within this field investigate the role of social processes involved in shaping 
technologies and the societal and political implications of their development and use. While 
STS scholars traditionally have looked at technological artefacts during their inception and 
production, researchers investigating issues of risk and vulnerability have been more 
concerned with the hazards posed by new technologies. By examining the public’s 
understanding of science and technology and their perceptions of the risks involved, they are 
able to gain insights into the ways our lives and social worlds are shaped by our coexistence 
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with risky technologies. In order to gain further understanding of the issues related to the 
research question at hand, I first looked at how the risks associated with modern industrial 
production have made scholars claim we live in a “risk society”. We also saw how modern 
societies are immersed in technology and depend on its operation to the extent that we speak 
of our cultures as “technological cultures” and how the advent of information and 
communications technologies (ICTs) have fuelled the rise of an “information society” 
(chapter 2). Although researchers may disagree whether and to what extent these technologies 
represent something fundamentally new, it is no doubt in my mind that ICTs and the advent 
of global information networks have transformed how we conduct business, how we organize 
our workplaces, what kind of work we do, and how we communicate with others in ways that 
have profound social and political implications. 
 To further analyse the risks and vulnerabilities surrounding computer systems, we set 
out to investigate whether Charles Perrow’s normal accident theory could be fruitfully 
applied to this avenue of research. His concepts of complexity and coupling were found to be 
directly relevant to computer systems and important tools in describing and analysing 
software and its vulnerability. Just as Perrow found in his analysis of nuclear power plants 
and chemical factories, faults are to be expected in most contemporary software applications. 
Such highly complex and tightly coupled software systems pose higher risks because of their 
inherent intractability and impenetrability exceeding human capacities for understanding. 
When employed in real life settings, the larger socio-technical system comprising the 
surrounding social organization as well as the technical system can attain even greater 
complexities that contribute to making accidents expected and indeed normal. However, 
scholars within the field of high reliability theory take a more optimistic view than Perrow, 
claiming that there are social and organizational measures that can be taken in order to 
improve the reliability of a system, thus lowering its vulnerability. While still acknowledging 
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the inevitability of accidents in complex systems, high reliability theorists feel that measures 
like continuous training and redundancy can and should be used to lower the risks associated 
with such systems. I concur with these sentiments, especially since Perrow’s view is that 
some technologies like nuclear power plants are inherently too complex and risky, and that 
these technologies should be abandoned. However, more comprehensive research is certainly 
warranted into the role of social and organizational factors in high-risk, high-reliability 
systems. 
 While Perrow’s theory proved useful as a starting point for assessing the risks and 
vulnerabilities involved in complex socio-technological systems, it lacks a convincing 
analysis of the social aspects of such systems. Specifically, it focuses solely on the inherent 
properties of systems, ignoring the fact that human beings and our complex social worlds are 
involved in high-risk systems. Perrow is more concerned with the static properties of complex 
systems and does not provide us with the tools needed for analysing the dynamic properties 
and individual and organizational issues that can contribute to vulnerabilities. His position is 
also a technological determinist one, seeing human and social interactions as unilaterally 
shaped by the properties of technological systems. For this reason, we turned to Scott A. 
Snook’s theory of practical drift, combining ideas from normal accident theory and high 
reliability theories. Investigating the 1994 “friendly fire” incident over Northern Iraq where 
two U.S. Air Force fighter planes shot down two U.S. Army helicopters, Snook employs 
theories of behavioural psychology and organizational sociology to formulate the concept of 
practical action, where adaptations to global rules and regulations are done locally in parts of 
a larger organization for pragmatic and sensible reasons. These local changes mean that 
subgroups within an organization can drift away from the initial set of rules governing 
operations within the organization. This drift occurs differently in different subgroups, setting 
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the stage for disaster when conditions change and action has to be coordinated across multiple 
subgroups. 
 This theory of practical drift formed the framework for an empirical investigation 
among professional software developers in order to ascertain whether Snook’s theory could 
be fruitfully employed in order to gain new understanding of the social and organizational 
issues affecting the production of software. I set out to identify factors that could be seen as 
contributing to practical drift in organizations developing software. My aim was to see how 
these factors could affect the vulnerability of the software itself, as well as the vulnerability of 
the users of this software. Software developers from two Norwegian companies, Telenor 
Mobile and FIRM, were interviewed about their attitudes towards risk and vulnerability, and 
their perception of factors that can affect the quality and vulnerability of the software the 
produce. 
 It can be debated whether the heavily designed and strictly regulated military 
organization that is the starting point for Snook’s analysis can be said to be similar to a 
software development organization. This issue is important when assessing whether Snook’s 
conclusions can be legitimately carried over to this new domain. The obvious differences in 
objectives should not distract us from the fact that there are important similarities in the way 
these two forms of organization operate, and that important lessons can be learned from 
Snook’s analysis. A military operation and a software development project are similar in that 
they both are set up to achieve a clearly defined task in a specific timeframe. They are both 
governed by rules and guidelines derived from practice and experience from similar 
endeavours. Work processes, social organization and the “chain of command” are usually 
specified in detail before work starts and are tailored for the specific situation. In both military 
operations and software development projects, individuals are expected to show personal 
initiative in order to accomplish the task at hand, and in most cases successful completion of 
   75 
the operation depends on this. In neither case do things go exactly as planned. Although there 
are differences in the goals and cultures of these two types of organization, I believe that the 
similarities are many and important enough to warrant further investigation. 
 When interviewing the software professionals at Telenor Mobile and FIRM, it became 
clear that they are prone to practical drift in much the same way as the military personnel in 
Snook’s research. The developers see strict rules and processes as necessary in settings were 
extreme reliability is needed. However, too strict methods are seen as boring and stifling 
developer creativity. The individualistic nature of the developers will make them take 
practical, pragmatic action if they feel methods and processes are unnecessary or burdensome. 
 I was able to identify four areas where social factors turned out to be contributing to 
practical drift. Firstly, issues of pleasure and enjoyment seem to be an important factor for 
software developers, motivating them in their daily work and determining their priorities. By 
striving to spend as much time as possible with the more pleasurable tasks, important tasks 
such as estimating and testing run the risk of being taken less seriously. As these are the tasks 
designed for lowering risks and finding flaws in the software, this factor can contribute to 
increased vulnerability. Secondly, the different mental models employed by the different 
groups involved in software development affect their ability to communicate and achieve a 
common understanding of the goals and requirements of the system under development. This 
can cause software to be developed that does not fit well within its future use context, and 
could lead to vulnerabilities for the users of the software. As we saw in the case of the 
London Ambulance Service, a software system based on false assumptions about its users and 
their requirements failed horrifically as the emergency call operators and ambulance crews 
tried to make it do what they needed it to do. Thirdly, the production pressures imposed on 
developers by managers and project leaders to reach project deadlines can force them to take 
shortcuts and thus bypass quality assurance mechanisms prescribed by the development 
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processes. Fourthly, a fragmentation of responsibility can occur when the actual contents of 
quality assurance and other important processes are not clearly specified. Developers can take 
these tasks lightly if they feel that the perceived skill of a fellow developer makes them 
unnecessary, or if they feel that they are somebody else’s responsibility entirely, as seems to 
be the case with security and privacy issues. 
 All these issues constitute social and organizational factors that contribute to the 
vulnerability of software systems and to the vulnerability of its users. This is by no means an 
exhaustive list, but it demonstrates some of the “non-technical” factors facing software 
developers, and it provides a novel starting point that could prove fruitful in the analysis of 
the vulnerabilities of software systems. Although these issues have been dealt with by 
researchers within the software engineering field, the addition of perspectives from social 
science theory in general and the STS field in particular can only improve the understanding 
of the complex social and organizational issues surrounding the practice of software 
development. 
4.2 Implications 
I have shown that software professionals are prone to practical drift in their daily practice of 
producing software. Processes and methods that are designed to ensure quality and reliable 
software are strayed from. This “drift” is understandable, since it has its basis in practical, 
pragmatic adjustments to local conditions and the tasks at hand. It is not due to incompetence 
or ill will. However, the result can clearly be vulnerable software, making its users vulnerable, 
and thereby making our societies vulnerable. It is therefore important that software 
professionals be aware of the potential consequences of vulnerabilities in their software. The 
links between practical adjustments and the vulnerabilities exposed to the users should be 
made clear. However, Snook warns us that we should not overshoot when trying to avoid 
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failures. Rather than tightening the rules, trying to define processes and methods that are 
aimed at producing error-free software, we should realise that the inherent complexities in 
computer systems make accidents normal. Systems should be designed in such away that 
failures are expected and dealt with. The LAS case is a grim reminder of what might happen 
if a system’s design is based upon the near-perfect functioning of all parts of the system, 
including its human actors. As we learned from the software developers at Telenor Mobile 
and FIRM, the fun and pleasure of creative design and programming are big parts of what 
motivates them. It is not advisable to replace the space for individual initiative and 
autonomous work with bureaucratic rigour.  
Developers, managers, and other groups involved in software production should also 
learn to recognize and respect each others “mental models”. Each group should come to 
acknowledge the merits of the others’ point of view and make the efforts necessary to gain an 
adequate understanding of their frames of mind. Managers and project leaders should strive to 
understand the technical issues that developers struggle with, and the unique skills of talented 
programmers. This would earn them the respect of their subordinates, and hopefully enable 
them to plan projects with more realistic resource allocations and deadlines, alleviating some 
of the production pressures that today result in vulnerable software. The developers should in 
turn learn to respect the social and organizational challenges tackled by their managers, who 
spend their days negotiating with demanding customers, unmotivated users, arrogant 
programmers, and impatient executives. All groups need to take the future users of the 
software more seriously. Since they are the ones that will be using the software, and 
ultimately suffer from its vulnerabilities, their view of the world needs to be taken as the basis 
for designing the system. Engineering-minded developers and manages should take into 
account the complexities of our social worlds and realize the futility of modelling all aspects 
of them in a finite digital computer. Design practices should to a greater extent incorporate the 
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dynamics and flexibility of a world of organizations and social configurations in constant 
change. 
 Security and privacy concerns seem to be a surprisingly neglected area within the two 
companies studied. This is probably symptomatic of a general attitude in most software 
development organizations. The number of challenges in producing working software is 
daunting even without these concerns. Nevertheless, in a world of viruses, worms, cracker 
attacks, and industrial espionage, software professionals need to take constant stock of their 
measures against these threats. Our increased vulnerability as data about all aspects of our 
lives are stored and processed by computer should be taken more seriously. 
 Social science theory has long been ignored by most researchers and practitioners of 
software engineering. At best, theories and methods from ethnography, behavioural science 
and other fields have been seen as tools to be used to solve software engineering problems, 
for instance for studying future software users and eliciting requirements from them. By 
instead using these tools for studying the software engineers themselves and their practices, 
important insights can be gained that will help us better understand the foundations of 
software engineering, its assumptions about the world and social organization and interaction, 
and software’s role in home and work life. These are results that will benefit both software 
engineering and the social study of technology. The STS field is especially well equipped to 
conduct this research, and I hope that this thesis has succeeded in pointing out some areas that 
could benefit from such a perspective. In the next section I try to identify a few avenues for 
further inquiry. 
4.3 Directions for Future Research 
Snook’s theory on practical drift is important in that it identifies the concepts of practical 
action and the drift away from established rules that it can entail. As we have seen, these 
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concepts can also be applied within research on software development. However, it seems to 
assume that things would be less risky if rules and regulations are followed. Clearly, practical 
drift does not occur through malice or incompetence on the part of the individuals within the 
organization, but by rational and pragmatic decisions taken by people doing their best. This is 
maybe the biggest weakness of Snook’s theory; it does not clearly prescribe an alternative that 
would counteract practical drift or incorporate it as a factor when designing organizations and 
processes. Being aware of practical drift and anticipating it is a step in the right direction, but 
more research is needed to learn more about how we can take these social factors into account 
and lower the risks and vulnerabilities associated with our technologies. The path forward lies 
in opening up the technologies and the social processes surrounding them. Having the 
anticipation of failures and breakdowns built into systems is in my opinion the key to future 
low-risk systems. STS scholars should be able to make a significant contribution here, with 
their insights into the nature of science and technology, and their body of research into how 
new technologies are formed. 
  Another weak point in Snook’s theory is his underlying assumption that 
practical drift is unequivocally negative. He acknowledges the fact that the local adaptations 
constituting drift are all practical from a local perspective. He even emphasizes that a strictly 
rule-based logic of action can be directly counterproductive when it comes to achieving the 
tasks at hand. However, he does not draw the conclusion that some of these local 
optimizations might be to the benefit of the system in question. While my empirical material 
does not support any definite conclusions, it seems to me that the software developers’ 
resistance towards overly strict methods (“overkill” as they call it) may sometimes be the 
healthy reaction of skilled professionals. How to distinguish between a benign course 
alteration and a dangerous case of practical drift is an entirely different matter, however. 
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Investigating whether and in what cases practical action can lower the vulnerability of a 
system, is an interesting avenue for future research. 
When it comes to studying software and software developers, an important alternative 
to the standard model of software development has proven increasingly successful the past 
decade. The so-called free/libre or open source software community has pioneered a 
development model based on free access to software, freely available source code and 
voluntary contribution from developers (DiBona et al., 1999; Moody, 2002; Raymond, 2001; 
Tuomi, 2001). This seemingly unviable conflation of hacker culture and anti-capitalist 
idealism has managed to produce software with purportedly equal or higher quality (in terms 
of reliability and number of bugs and security flaws) than the usual proprietary industry 
model. Some research has been conducted into this phenomenon, but in the context of drift 
and vulnerability future research could uncover whether open source developers are less 
prone to practical drift than industry developers, and how the differences in development 
approaches affect the vulnerability of the software. This research could start with the notions 
of pleasure, control, and power explored here. Developers within the open source community 
contribute to projects as they see fit and according to personal skills and interests, thereby 
benefiting from the effects of having developers who derive pleasure from the programming 
tasks and are motivated by doing what they find to be “fun” at any given time. The rewards 
for the developers are in terms of respect and admiration from their peers rather than financial 
gains. Combined with a review process where the program code is continuously open to 
scrutiny and improvement by every other developer, the open model should at first glance 
guarantee better software. However, the geographical distribution of developers, lack of 
central authority to ensure that the routine tasks are done as well as the “fun” tasks, and 
potential high turnover of developers carry with them their own set of risks and vulnerabilities 
that can spill over into the software. 
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 Outsourcing parts of the software development process to low-cost developers in 
third-world countries such as India are being increasingly explored as a way of reducing the 
costs associated with the production of software (see for instance Kobitzsch et al., 2001). 
More research, for instance in the form of case studies of software development projects 
where a significant portion of the development work is done in a remote location, should 
provide a better understanding of the social and cultural issues involved. The communication 
of mental models needed for successful software development across cultural barriers should 
be studied and the implications for software vulnerability analysed. It is my firm belief that 
such research would conclude that the risks involved in this type of outsourcing far outweigh 
any potential benefits. The difficulties of communicating mental models and cooperating on 
building software are daunting even when developers, managers and users are located in the 
same building. Software development spanning continents, time zones, languages and 
cultures would in my opinion be fraught with social and cultural issues that would make any 
such venture highly risky. Offshore outsourcing, as it is sometimes called, could conceivably 
work in limited, technical domains were the requirements can be unambiguously stated in 
advance, and where the required interaction with future users is at a minimum. 
 Most of the research on drift and vulnerability has focused on accidents and disasters, 
usually of the spectacular kind, such as nuclear accidents and friendly fire incidents. Another 
avenue of research which could prove rewarding, would be to study successful organizations 
that are able to deliver software on time, on budget, and with the correct functionality. By 
comparing their social and organizational contexts with those of less successful counterparts, 
important insights could be acquired that would benefit the field of software engineering. 
 While this thesis has had the development of software as its focus, and dealt primarily 
with software developers, we touched somewhat on the role of the other groups involved in 
the production and use of software systems, especially the end-users. They are the individuals 
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who are expected to use the software after it is developed and put into production. A lot of 
research has gone into the design of user interfaces and to make computer systems easier to 
use. Similarly, software engineering research has taken a particular interest in requirements 
elicitation from the end-users. Less research, however, has been conducted on exactly how 
misunderstood or unstable requirements contribute to vulnerable software during the 
development process; how mismatches between end-user requirements and actual system 
operation can increase the vulnerability of the users themselves; and how users cope with 
vulnerable software. These are all avenues of research that can benefit from a closer 
cooperation between researchers from software engineering and the social sciences, especially 
the STS field. 
4.4 Anticipating Vulnerability 
In one of the most cited and debated articles within the software engineering field, Frederick 
Brooks claimed that the essence of software engineering was such that there would probably 
not be a “single development, in either technology or management technique, which by itself 
promises even one order of magnitude improvement in productivity, in reliability, in 
simplicity [of software projects]” (Brooks, 1987, p. 10) within the next decade. Using images 
from popular mythology, Brooks compared such a development to the “silver bullet” needed 
to slay the “werewolf” of inherent complexity. 16 years later, most of his critics will have to 
concede that although a lot of new developments within software engineering were each 
heralded as an answer, none has proven to be the decisive silver bullet. Nothing on the 
horizon indicates that a werewolf killer will be found in the near future. This echoes Perrow’s 
view about our limited ability to understand complex systems due to their intrinsic properties. 
The weak points of Perrow’s theory notwithstanding; this is a phenomenon we have to come 
to grips with as we surround ourselves with more computers and software, each linked to 
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other, complex systems. We are increasingly basing our existence on the faultless, continuous 
operation of these networks. 
 To me, the way forward lies in accepting these risks, shedding our naïve faith in 
scientific and technological solutions that are supposed to make complex systems risk-free. 
Clearly, the social and organizational issues touched upon in this thesis, as well as the 
properties of complex technological systems, show us that we will have to learn to live with 
risks and vulnerabilities. This is especially evident within the field of ICTs, as any computer 
user can attest to. Efforts should therefore be directed to better understanding the complex 
intertwining of the social and the technical that influences the vulnerabilities of our 
technologies and thereby of our societies and our selves. Theories from the STS field, with 
their emphasis on studying both the social and the technical, should prove invaluable in 
gaining understanding of how we can build software systems and other technologies in a way 
that takes risks and vulnerabilities into account. Software developers can be trained to 
recognize the social nature of their work, rather than seeing it as a purely technical task. 
Realizing that other groups may have other mental models or technological frames of their 
understanding of software systems, can help developers communicate better with users and 
other stakeholders, thereby producing software that is better suited to its future use. By better 
understanding software developers, their motivations, and social world, new processes can be 
created that makes software development more predictable to managers, eliminating 
production pressures as a source of software vulnerabilities. With this new awareness, 
software developers could focus on organizing their work in new ways, producing software 
that is made less vulnerable not by eliminating risks, but by anticipating them.
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Appendix A: List of interviewees 
Telenor Mobile 
Name Position Date of interview 
Paul Skrede Section Manager 13.06.2003 
Steinar Lundeberg Developer 13.06.2003 
Daniel Bakkelund Architect/Developer 16.06.2003 
Per Hustad Developer 16.06.2003 
Knut Marius Hansen Configuration 
Manager/Developer 
18.06.2003 
Stian Dahle Developer 19.06.2003 
Rodin Lie Architect/Developer 20.06.2003 
FIRM 
Name Position Date of interview 
Peter Myklebust Director of Development 23.06.2003 
Trond Johansen QA Manager 23.06.2003 
Hans Olav Damskog Developer 25.06.2003 
Øyvind Forsbak Developer 26.06.2003 
Kjell Tore Hveding Developer 26.06.2003 
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